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This Article examines climate change as an ethical and moral issue 
from the perspective of an American citizen, and considers concrete 
legal remedies she might pursue.1 
 
1 Sincere thanks to Professor Dianne Rahm for her expertise and insights into the 
climate change crisis. 
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The moral challenge with which climate change confronts an 
individual citizen differs from that of officials representing political 
institutions. This Article urges that, in times of crisis, a citizen faces a 
heightened duty to act. The fundamental duty of a citizen with respect 
to climate change—to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by changing 
her way of life—should not be regarded as the sole obligation a 
citizen has in the face of this crisis. If the society offers remedies to 
individual citizens through its institutions, citizens should pursue 
those remedies even if federal regulation is absent. Whether the moral 
duty manifests itself as changing one’s individual habits or availing 
oneself of remedies the society’s institutions offer, different ways of 
evaluating the extent of one’s responsibilities present themselves. 
Two broad categories suggest opposite ends of a moral spectrum. 
Consequentialism evaluates the morality of an action on the basis of 
its utility in solving the problem. If an action would make no 
difference, one cannot commit an immoral act. The deontological 
view, by contrast, evaluates the moral duties one possesses before 
undertaking the act to decide whether an obligation exists to do it. 
This Article argues that, in the context of climate change, the 
deontological view provides the most persuasive argument for the 
individual citizens or small neighborhood groups. A dilemma of 
historic dimensions such as the one that climate change presents may 
confront citizens with the duty to litigate when possible to mitigate or 
adapt to its effects. 
Avenues for citizen litigation seem limited, however. This Article 
analyzes the current federal statutory and regulatory landscape, and 
concludes that citizens find themselves in the anomalous position of 
trying to combat a serious problem of federal dimensions without 
federal statutory redress, whether under proposed new federal 
legislation or the Clean Air Act. Given this vacuum at the federal 
level, three theories—public nuisance, the public trust doctrine, and 
state-level environmental citizen suits—may provide remedies in the 
climate change context. Most promising are those jurisdictions that 
allow plaintiffs to prove damages under these three theories without 
first satisfying administrative prerequisites that apply federal or state 
statutory standards to determine whether any violation occurred. With 
few exceptions, those standards do not address greenhouse gases and 
would therefore preempt climate change suits. If the court evaluates 
harm without administrative prerequisites, it becomes possible to 
fashion judicial remedies. Statutes or doctrines that make it possible 
to sue private as well as governmental entities are also important. The 
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Article gives examples of cases and statutes that have already 
demonstrated their potential utility in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
The next question becomes how to approach litigation based on 
climate change. The approach to standing that recent federal 
decisions, particularly Massachusetts v. EPA2 and Connecticut v. 
American Electric Power Company,3 have established provide 
citizens with an approach to harm (future damages should be 
considered in the present), attributability (if the defendant contributes 
an increment of greenhouse gases, this suffices to connect its actions 
to the harm), and redressability (the court can offer a measure of 
redress by decreasing the problem even by a small quantity). 
Further, these federal decisions appear to support a deontological 
view of the moral duty to confront climate change: mitigating the 
emission of greenhouse gases even by a fraction suffices as a remedy 
and warrants judicial intervention, in part because of preexisting 
duties the United States possesses. Granted, these findings involved 
mobile source emissions in the entire country on the one hand and 
emissions from coal-fired power plants in several states on the other. 
By accepting small increments of change as sufficient, the federal 
courts suggest that the moral decision whether to act depends not on 
the percentage of the climate change crisis the act solves, but whether, 
ex ante, it is the right thing to do. 
These new judicial approaches would apply to cases brought under 
a number of legal theories that could form the basis of citizen suits. At 
a minimum, one must identify the existence of such legal theories to 
support the somewhat outlandish proposal that time-consuming, 
expensive actions such as litigation could constitute part of a citizen’s 
moral duty in the face of serious ecological harm. 
I 
RETHINKING THE MORAL DUTY TO CONFRONT 
CLIMATE CHANGE ON AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
When one speaks of moral duties associated with climate change, a 
vast distance separates individual Americans from those who 
represented them at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, and elected federal 
 
2 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
3 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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representatives who currently debate legislation to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. Diplomats and legislators have an official duty to 
ensure the safety of the country’s citizens and the preservation of its 
natural resources. The historical role of the United States in creating 
the climate change dilemma, its ongoing contribution to the problem, 
and its efforts to mitigate the problem all speak to moral issues 
imposed on the United States as a country, and its leaders in their 
official capacities. When one speaks of the moral duties of citizens, 
one often uses this term to signify individuals acting in their official 
capacity as representatives of the United States. With respect to the 
collective moral responsibility of countries, their leaders, and their 
citizens in their official capacities, a number of moral philosophers 
have concluded that moral responsibility exists where a clear 
decision-making structure exists and the population participates, at 
some level, in those decisions. As Professor Virginia Held writes, 
“[w]hen a group such as a nation or a corporation has a relatively 
clear structure and set of decision procedures, it certainly seems that it 
is capable of acting and, one can well argue, that it should be 
considered morally, as well as legally, responsible.”4 
Those individual Americans who comprehend climate change as a 
real threat must assess the nature and extent of their own moral 
responsibility in light of the actions their representatives have taken in 
their official capacities. Such an assessment is well known and 
sobering. At present the United States faces an anomalous situation: 
despite a grave ecological crisis whose harbingers have already 
manifested themselves, the United States has not yet ratified the 
Copenhagen Accord that President Barak Obama negotiated at the 
2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference. Even if the most 
recent treaty becomes effective, questions remain regarding the new 
treaty’s specifics and legal status.5 The House of Representatives 
approved comprehensive legislation to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by changing the way America produces and uses energy, 
but the legislation failed for lack of a Senate version. Observers have 
argued that the House will fail to achieve needed reductions by 
exempting existing coal-fired electric plants from the Environmental 
 
4 VIRGINIA HELD, HOW TERRORISM IS WRONG: MORALITY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
91 (2008). 
5 Copenhagen Accord Marks First Step Towards Legally Binding Global Climate 
Agreement, EU ENVIRONMENT POLICY BRIEF (Eur. Comm’n Env’t, Brussels, Belg.), Dec. 
2009, at 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/news/brief/2009_12/newsletter 
_12_2009.pdf. 
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Protection Agency’s (EPA) command-and-control regulations, 
creating an incentive to expand existing facilities to circumvent this 
form of regulation.6 After the Supreme Court finally resolved whether 
the EPA was required to evaluate whether greenhouse gases from 
mobile sources were air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, the EPA 
has notified the public that it will seek rules to regulate a defined set 
of greenhouse gases, both from mobile sources and, over several 
years, from stationary sources as well.7 
Years before the federal government had progressed even this far, 
other units of government sought to fill the void. State governments 
acted within their own jurisdictions to regulate greenhouse gases and 
to form regional agreements for this purpose.8 Agreements among 
mayors across the country are also well documented.9 As this Article 
discusses, state governments have played a critical role in federal 
litigation to challenge national climate change policy as well as coal-
fired electric generating plants. 
On a federal level, legislation, Clean Air Act rules, or both may be 
passed sometime in the future. States may form cap-and-trade 
agreements with some uncertainties as to their constitutionality. Aside 
from these different levels of government, the question remains 
whether individuals bear moral responsibility to assist in society’s 
adaptation to climate change or its efforts to mitigate it. Aside from 
acting as a concerned voter, individual responsibility in the climate 
change context usually brings strictly individual practices to mind: the 
myriad ways in which each person can reduce his or her carbon 
footprint. Without question, the individual decisions that millions of 
people make each day play a decisive role in decreasing greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
When faced with such a grave issue, however, one must question 
whether one’s moral responsibility ends with the ecological impact of 
personal habits. This Article assesses the adequacy of strictly 
 
6 Gethin Chamberlain, Luke Harding, Lizzie Davies & Xan Rice, Copenhagen Summit: 
“First Step” to a New Order—Or a “Betrayal of Our Grandchildren,” GUARDIAN (U.K.) 
(Dec. 20, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/20/copenhagen-climate 
-summit-deal-reactions. 
7 See infra notes 71–75 (mobile sources), 76–78 (stationary sources). 
8 See Eleanor Stein, Regional Initiatives to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, in 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 315 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007); David 
Hodas, State Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 343 (Michael B. 
Gerrard ed., 2007). 
9 See, e.g., J. Kevin Healy, Local Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. 
LAW 421 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007). 
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individual practices from a moral perspective when one is confronted 
by such a grave ecological threat. Various moral claims of 
organizations that represent many different points of view, whether 
religious or secular, suggest that common ground exists as to the 
moral obligations that climate change imposes on individuals. Based 
on the morality of these diverse points of view as well as the moral 
assumptions that inform strictly individual actions to mitigate climate 
change, the consequences of climate change create a higher moral 
obligation than one might normally impose on individuals. This 
obligation includes the willingness to join in litigation to deter 
governmental and corporate actions that exacerbate the climate crisis. 
If one accepts the proposition that the grave exigencies of our 
historical period impose on individuals a higher moral duty to help 
society adapt to and mitigate climate change, viable legal remedies 
must exist for a person to act on that duty. This Article considers 
federal citizen suits, public nuisance, the public trust doctrine, and 
state citizen suits in the climate change context. 
A. Some Ethical and Moral Interpretations 
of the Climate Change Problem 
A number of considerations inform a person’s individual moral 
duties with regard to climate change. For an American citizen, an 
assertion of less developed countries is relevant: that those countries 
bearing primary historical responsibility for our global environmental 
problem should assume greater responsibility for resolving it.10 
Further, lesser developed countries point out that they will suffer 
harsher climate impacts because of their geographical locations, a 
prediction made more unjust given their countries’ minor historical 
contribution to the problem.11 These realities have led developing 
nations to insist on special consideration in any international 
agreements; other nations question the fairness of absolving rapidly 
industrializing countries such as China or India of greater obligations 
by labeling them as “developing.” Countries agree, however, that the 
current generation should do everything possible to minimize the 
 
10 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
11 Michael Grubb, Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on 
Climate Change, 71 INT’L AFF. 463, 463 (1995), cited in DIANNE RAHM, CLIMATE 
CHANGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SCIENCE, THE POLITICS, AND THE 
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 112 (2010). 
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extent to which the present ecological crisis is shifted onto future 
generations. These moral obligations vie for inclusion in the 
international ethical framework to deal with climate change. 
The ethical and moral reactions of individual citizens and 
nongovernmental institutions to climate change share basic themes. 
Dianne Rahm has analyzed the varying religious and secular reactions 
to climate change as a moral issue; her observations provide helpful 
insight into the issues this Article addresses.12 Obviously, 
environmentalists and their organizations urge the existence of a 
moral obligation to alter one’s individual habits to ensure a 
sustainable future for posterity.13 Further, the Catholic Church has 
spoken in strong terms on the need to prevent climate change, to use 
natural resources prudently, to live in harmony with God’s Creation, 
to recognize that climate change is a nonpartisan issue that calls us to 
protect “the one human family” of God, to protect future generations, 
and to recognize as well that the poor and vulnerable will suffer more 
than others as a result of climate change.14 The mainstream Protestant 
churches have also called for changes in policy and individual 
behavior through the National Council of Churches.15 A contingent of 
 
12 DIANNE RAHM, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SCIENCE, 
THE POLITICS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 108–25 (2010). 
13 Walter Gibbs, Gore and U.N. Panel Are Awarded Nobel Peace Prize, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/12/world/europe/12iht-13nobel.7866739 
.html (quoting Gore’s comments on climate change as a moral issue), cited in RAHM, 
supra note 12, at 113; see also Fen Osler Hampson & Judith Reppy, Environmental 
Change & Social Justice, ENV’T, Apr. 1997, at 13, cited in RAHM, supra note 12, at 114. 
14 U.S. Catholic Bishops on Ecology and Environmental Justice, CATHOLIC 
CONSERVATION CENTER, http://conservation.catholic.org/u_s_bishops.htm (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2010) (quoting U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, RENEWING THE 
EARTH (1992)), cited in RAHM, supra note 12, at 116–18; Melissa Stults, Religious 
Groups Becoming a Factor in Climate Policy Debate, CLIMATE.ORG, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070407060340/http://www.climate.org/topics/localaction 
/religion-climate-change.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (accessed by searching for 
climate.org in the Internet Archive index), cited in RAHM, supra note 12, at 116–19; 
Thomas G. Wenski & Nicholas DiMarzio, Faithful Stewards of God’s Creation: A 
Catholic Resource for Environmental Justice and Climate Change, U.S. CONFERENCE OF 
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/sdwp /ejp/climate/index.shtml (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2010), cited in RAHM, supra note 12, at 116–18; James Macintyre, Pope to Make 
Climate Action a Moral Obligation, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 22, 2007), http:// 
news.independent.co.uk/europe/article2987811.ece, cited in RAHM, supra note 12, at 117. 
15 An Examination of the Views of Religious Organizations Regarding Global 
Warming: Hearing on Religious Groups’ Views and Global Warming Before the S. Comm. 
on Environment and Public Works, 110th Cong. (2007) (written testimony of John L. Carr, 
Secretary, Department of Social Development and World Peace, U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops), cited in RAHM, supra note 12, at 118; see also Stults, supra note 14. 
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evangelical Christians has also called for federal climate change 
legislation and for education in churches and schools on the issue.16 
In addition to those who see moral responsibility for climate 
change in theological terms, secular moral philosophers have also 
concluded that Americans bear moral responsibility for their failure to 
acknowledge their disproportionate contribution to the climate 
crisis.17 
These moral arguments—whether those of countries, non-
governmental entities, churches, or philosophers—share certain 
concepts in common that are relevant to one’s decision as to whether 
one should pursue legal remedies to combat climate change. First, 
whatever vocabulary one may use, human beings bear a moral 
responsibility to combat climate change because beauty, complexity, 
and sublimity of the natural world possess intrinsic value. Second, 
human beings bear a moral responsibility to preserve their own 
civilization, which has intrinsic worth, makes existence as we know it 
possible, and faces incalculable harm in the absence of concerted 
action. Third, this generation bears a grave responsibility to minimize 
the suffering that climate change will inflict on the poor and future 
generations. Fourth, in part because carbon dioxide distributes 
quickly, it affects regions the world over, regardless of where the 
emissions originated. As a result, one region that produces a 
disproportionate quantity of carbon dioxide should bear a 
commensurate burden to reduce the pollution. One should consider 
these four moral principles when evaluating the extent of a citizen’s 
duty to combat climate change, which may include something as 
onerous as legal action. 
B. Climate Change Arguably Heightens a Citizen’s Duty 
in the Legal System 
On its face, the notion that citizens bear a moral responsibility to 
combat climate change in a legal forum seems outlandish. Common 
sense would dictate that the decision to instigate something as 
expensive, time-consuming, and emotionally trying as litigation 
 
16 EVANGELICAL ENVTL. NETWORK, http://creationcare.org/blank.php?id=35 (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2010); Laurie Goodstein, Living Day to Day by a Gospel of Green, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/08/garden/08ball.html, cited in 
RAHM, supra note 12, at 121; Climate Change: An Evangelical Call to Action, 
CHRISTIANS & CLIMATE, http://christiansandclimate.org/learn /call-to-action/ (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2010). 
17 HELD, supra note 4, at 8. 
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should be left to the discretion of would-be litigants. Further, no 
public opprobrium should accompany whatever decision those 
individuals make. Even if one concluded that an individual moral 
duty to combat climate change existed, common sense might well 
reject any obligation to do so in a legal forum. 
However, as a popular paraphrase of Dante goes, “the hottest 
places in hell are reserved for those who in a period of moral crisis 
maintain their neutrality.”18 All indications, including those addressed 
in this Article, point toward the need to change our concept of civic 
duty to combat climate change. In the present, indications of climate 
change in the United States have already manifested themselves: 
increased air and water temperature, decreased frost days, increased 
region-specific downpours, increased sea level, decreased snow 
cover, shrunken glaciers, melted permafrost, decreased sea ice, and 
harm to sea life from acidified oceans.19 In the coming decades, 
scientists predict severe environmental impacts for different regions 
of the United States and resulting effects on human beings:20 large 
regions without sufficient water to sustain themselves, for example. 
The United States will also feel international consequences from 
famine, disease, and war.21 In the long term, at least one study 
questions whether human beings can adapt to the results of quick and 
abrupt climatic conditions at all.22 
Whether one considers the present situation, the near future, or the 
long term, the consequences of climate change require us to change 
many assumptions about our duties as citizens. This includes a 
citizen’s obligation to contest environmentally damaging actions by 
government or industry. In our historical period, human actions—both 
institutional and personal—carry unprecedented consequences for 
posterity. Civic participation in the form of litigation that enables 
citizens to combat ecologically damaging institutional behavior may 
also reach the level of a moral duty. 
 
18 Remarks of John F. Kennedy in Bonn, West Germany (June 24, 1963), in 
RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM THE 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 230 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989) (misquoting lines 35–42 
of DANTE’S INFERNO). 
19 U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 9–10 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2009). 
20 See id. at 12. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. at 156. 
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C. Opposing Moral Interpretations: 
Personal Practices to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
In light of the grave consequences that could result from climate 
change, some ethicists, including Professors Virginia Held and 
Marcus Hedahl, have considered not just the duty of governments, but 
the nature and extent of the moral obligation imposed on individuals 
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions through their individual 
behavior.23 Clearly, these individual practices consume far less time, 
energy, or money than litigation. The moral considerations that 
accompany such individual practices provide a basis for evaluating 
whether one can consider litigation to combat climate change as a 
duty as well.24 
Myriad examples illustrate individual practices that reduce carbon 
emissions. Here are a few: Eliminate the use of plastic grocery bags. 
Americans use 100 billion of these annually, enough to require 12 
million barrels of oil to produce.25 Replace incandescent bulbs with 
fluorescent ones. Install small home solar panels to run appliances. 
Use clotheslines instead of dryers when possible. Walk, use mass 
transit, or carpool whenever possible. Buy locally grown produce 
when possible, since fresh produce in the United States can travel up 
to 1,500 miles to market.26 Except for carpooling, these practices are 
simple and unilateral, and the personal cost to carry them out is low. 
In fact, the individual often benefits economically by adopting them.27 
Such actions share certain characteristics. In addition to requiring 
very little cooperation with other people and incurring little cost, very 
little uncertainty exists that each of these actions reduces greenhouse 
gas emissions. Each of these acts share another trait: the incremental 
benefit of a single individual taking one of these actions is 
 
23 See generally HELD, supra note 4; Marcus Hedahl & Kyle Fruh, Coping with 
Climate Change: What Justice Demands of Surfers, Mormons, and the Rest of Us, 94 
MONIST (forthcoming 2011) (both discussing the ethical and moral duties of individuals 
and governments to minimize their carbon footprints on the environment). 
24 See Hedahl & Fruh, supra note 23 (discussing individual responsibility for climate 
change). 
25 America’s Dirty Little Oil Secret: Plastic Bottles and Bags, BUS. SHRINK (Apr. 26, 
2008), http://businessshrink.biz/psychologyofbusiness/2008/04/26/americas-dirtly-little-oil 
-secret-plastic-bottles-and-bags/. 
26 Enrique Gili, A Budding Market for Food Less Travelled, INTER PRESS SERVICE 
NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 4, 2007), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39522 (conversion to 
miles added). 
27 MICHAEL E. MANN & LEE R. KUMP, DIRE PREDICTIONS: UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL 
WARMING 180 (2008). 
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infinitesimal in comparison with the magnitude of the climate change 
problem. From a consequentialist point of view, the moral obligation 
to engage in these practices is almost nonexistent because the 
individual’s actions result in almost no benefit. 
The consequentialist view is just one way to evaluate one’s moral 
obligation, however. If one dismisses any consideration of an 
individual action as moral or immoral because it results in no 
appreciable benefit or harm, one falls into further moral dilemmas. 
First, if individual action is irrelevant as to any pressing moral 
dilemma that confronts mass society, individuals never have a duty to 
take any action. In each case, the cosequentialist argument outlined in 
this Article absolves the individual from the duty to act if doing so 
would fail to produce some undefined quantum of benefit. Second, in 
a sense, the consequentialist view erodes the very sense of duty that 
would result in collective action to address the problem, in this case, 
the climate crisis. That view precludes citizens from acting together 
based on the belief in the morality of a discrete action which, taken 
collectively, would result in a tremendous benefit. 
Third, the consequentialist view fails to consider whether a person 
possesses a moral duty to reduce greenhouse gases that arises from 
personal identity and conscience without regard to the social utility. 
From this perspective, one might conclude that the failure to adopt the 
practice would violate one’s moral duty. One might call this the 
deontological view. The person’s way of life—if it reflects typical 
American habits—caused her to contribute to climate change in gross 
disproportion to people in other countries, and she benefitted 
personally from this consumption. In addition to this individual 
responsibility is collective responsibility for her country’s actions. If 
one accepts that collective responsibility exists, a citizen bears 
responsibility because she is a citizen of a country that has 
contributed the lion’s share of carbon emissions to the atmosphere. 
Because of her citizenship and the benefits she derived from this 
collective behavior, she should assume responsibility in whatever 
minute way possible. Anchoring the moral obligation in individual 
and collective duty this way comports with considerations of 
historical, intergenerational, and geographical equity already 
discussed. Preexisting duties, not utility after the fact, create a moral 
obligation to adopt certain individual practices. 
Fourth, one could also arrive at the conclusion that one bears a duty 
to decrease carbon dioxide emissions even without reference to 
preexisting individual or collective duty. The harms that climate 
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change will cause in the future could form the basis for a prospective 
duty to adopt practices consistent with reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions. In this view, to act in manner that contributes to the future 
consequences of climate change is immoral. Again, under this view, 
the quantum of benefit that would result from an individual act is 
irrelevant. Thus far this discussion has focused on unilateral behaviors 
an individual can adopt that: (1) almost certainly decrease the quantity 
of greenhouse gases emitted, (2) pose little cost and possible benefit 
to the individual, and (3) taken alone, produce infinitesimal benefit. 
How moral duties that individuals bear translate to moral duties of 
groups remains unexamined. 
D. From Individual to Group Responsibility for Climate Change 
The so-called collective action problem is an obvious place to start. 
Applied to the climate crisis, the collective action theory would 
recognize that if everyone, or a significant majority of individuals, 
were to perform acts, those acts, when considered alone, would make 
no difference.28 Yet, their collective acts would make a huge 
difference in combating climate change.29 According to the collective 
action theory, however, the larger the group, the less likely the 
individuals who comprise it will engage in the desirable behavior.30 
The collective action problem constitutes an observation of human 
behavior rather than a moral assessment. Its observations are useful, 
however, when determining whether groups of varying size bear 
moral responsibility for combating climate change. From a 
consequentialist perspective, one might argue that the collective 
action problem only confirms that the individual bears no moral 
obligation to engage in personal actions that infinitesimally decrease 
greenhouse gas emissions. Not only would the individual action fail 
to make a difference, the individual actions would fail to motivate 
other citizens in numbers significant enough to make a difference.31 
However, such an argument leaves a number of questions 
unanswered. First, at what point does one consider the actions of a 
group or a nation to have made a significant difference? As the 
Supreme Court concluded in the redressability portion of its standing 
 
28 MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 9–15, 53–57 (rev. ed. 1971). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Hedahl & Fruh, supra note 23. 
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analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA,32 the EPA’s failure to regulate 
carbon dioxide emissions from mobile sources contributed to the 
problem but was not its sole cause.33 Even if one viewed carbon 
dioxide emissions on an international level, EPA regulation would 
improve the situation incrementally. Similarly, there has to be some 
threshold at which, even from a consequentialist perspective, the 
individual actions of a group of people matter because they make a 
detectable difference in mitigating a problem that threatens nature and 
all people. 
Second, the collective action problem suggests that the larger the 
group, the less likely the individuals in the group will engage in 
constructive behavior. But the precise group size at which individuals 
cease to engage is not static or empirical. While the theory of the 
collective action problem is useful in analyzing whether groups of 
people bear moral obligations with regard to social problems, it leaves 
important questions unanswered. 
A number of moral philosophers reject the concept of group 
responsibility. They observe that a collection of individuals lacks the 
volition, emotions, and reasoning that an individual possesses.34 Many 
disagree with this conclusion, however. The philosopher Larry May 
has written that “people should see themselves as sharing 
responsibility for various harms perpetrated by, or occurring within, 
their communities.”35 The moral philosopher Virginia Held inquires 
what kinds of communities should share the responsibility May 
describes.36 She first argues that a “nation or a corporation” with a 
“relatively clear structure and set of decision procedures” should be 
“considered morally, as well as legally, responsible.”37 She contrasts 
the moral responsibility of such an entity in its official capacity with 
the individual moral responsibility of its employees or citizens. 
“[M]uch more needs to be ascertained about which officials or 
executives are responsible for what before we can consider individual 
members of nations or corporations responsible.”38 
 
32 549 U.S. 497, 525–26 (2007). 
33 Id. 
34 See HELD, supra note 4, at 94 (discussing philosophers who reject the concept of 
group responsibility). 
35 Id. at 97 (quoting LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1992)). 
36 Id. at 96–100. 
37 Id. at 91. 
38 Id. 
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The larger and more organized the group—a nation or corporation, 
for example—the more difficult to relate the moral obligations of 
individuals to those of the institution. For example, a private 
American citizen cannot file suit or otherwise take action as a 
representative of the United States government, just as a dues-paying 
National Wildlife Federation member cannot file a pleading on behalf 
of the organization. In each case, a hierarchical decision-making 
process would determine whether the proposed action comported with 
the priorities and budget of the organization. 
But one should not confine the moral issues associated with 
climate change to those who act in an official capacity for a political 
entity, the responsibilities a citizen bears by virtue of his or her 
citizenship, or strictly individual responsibility. As Held puts it, “[t]he 
group can be collectively responsible for the failure to take 
responsibility when it ought to.”39 Held concludes that North 
Americans bear varying degrees of moral obligation, not because of 
their citizenship, but because of habits they collectively embrace and 
the consequences they collectively ignore: 
North Americans, for instance, are at present collectively 
responsible for not taking responsibility for their immoral 
overconsumption of the world’s resources and overproduction of 
the world’s pollution and climate change. North Americans are 
morally responsible for failing to acknowledge that they share 
responsibility for these harms and ought to reduce such 
overconsumption and climate change.40 
The assertion of moral responsibility for contributing to climate 
change based on collective habits of consumption, along with a 
collective denial of responsibility, shifts the focus of moral 
responsibility away from citizenship in a large structured entity. Even 
so, the habits of large groups are difficult to assess. Held, for 
example, qualifies her general assessment of North Americans by 
differentiating between groups within the culture. She distinguishes 
those who do not engage in overconsumption, such as Native 
Americans, from those who do.41 
A more helpful inquiry concerns small groups of individuals: large 
enough that they can accomplish more collectively than any one 
member of the group, but small enough that each individual plays an 
 
39 Id. at 103. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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important role in the decisions the group makes. Professor Held 
agrees with those moral philosophers who consider it possible to 
assign moral responsibility to relatively small, minimally organized 
groups.42 She offers the example of passengers on a subway who 
witness a larger child beating a smaller child to the point of serious 
harm or death. Under such circumstances, Held writes, the 
unorganized nature of the passengers as a group becomes irrelevant.43 
As a group they bear responsibility at least to notify the conductor. 
Further, unlike members of a highly structured organization like a 
nation or corporation, the individual group members in this example 
face few institutional barriers to taking action, so that one can 
ascertain whether an individual in the group acted on his or her 
individual responsibility. 
The example of an unorganized group facing a situation that 
morally requires response sheds light on the question posed in this 
Article: whether an individual or group bears a moral responsibility to 
take legal action in order to combat actions that exacerbate climate 
change. A neighborhood organization in New Orleans, Louisiana, 
provides a real-world example of the way the “unorganized group” 
scenario can apply in the legal context.44 Without question, the Holy 
Cross Neighborhood Association (Association) in New Orleans’ 
Ninth Ward is more organized than Held’s subway passengers: the 
association has officers, a board of directors, and an organizational 
goal to make the Holy Cross community “the best place in the city to 
live and raise a family.”45 Nevertheless, the small size of the 
 
42 Id. at 97. 
43 Id.  
44 See HELP HOLY CROSS, http://www.helpholycross.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
45 About the Holy Cross Neighborhood Association, HOLY CROSS NEIGHBORHOOD 
ASS’N NEWSL. (Holy Cross Neighborhood Ass’n, New Orleans, La.), June–Aug. 2009, at 
1, 12, available at http://davidrmacaulay.typepad.com/HCNA_Newsletter16.pdf. The 
Holy Cross Neighborhood Association conveys the sense of group responsibility for 
concrete problems in the community: 
We know our neighborhoods are vulnerable to the water and we are working to 
make that water a resource. We know that current protections are inadequate; we 
are rebuilding higher, stronger, better, working for enhanced natural protections 
(restoration of Bayou Bienvenue) and for effective built protections and 
infrastructure. We know most of our neighbors are not back and that there’s been 
no concerted, effective effort to help them return. We’re finding them ourselves and 
person to person, organization to organization, family to family, doing everything 
in our power to help our former residents make informed decisions. We continue 
advocating for ourselves at every level. 
Id. at 1. 
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organization and the specific objective to improve a single 
neighborhood make the Association far more porous than a unit of 
government or a corporation. Its small size and loose organization 
also make individual participation in the Association of paramount 
importance. 
Although the Associations’ members share more in common and 
more organization than Held’s subway passengers, the moral 
responsibilities they bear resemble those of the unorganized group. 
The Association’s priorities originate with individual members who 
report problems in the community.46 For example: Over an extended 
period of time, members observed an environmentally damaging 
dredging project by the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(Corps) that involved contaminated sediment from a canal that barges 
had used for decades to transport hydrocarbon-containing cargo.47 
Association members learned the Corps planned to dredge the 
contaminated sediment and relocate it to an estuary despite its toxic 
effect on benthic organisms upon which the entire food chain relied.48 
Association members sought to negotiate with Corps representatives 
for changes to the plan.49 Ultimately the Association coalesced with 
environmental organizations and the Tulane Environmental Law 
Clinic to bring suit under the National Environmental Policy Act50 
(NEPA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act51 
(RCRA).52 The suit met with significant success, including the 
requirement that the Corps reassess the environmental impact of its 
project.53 
One should note fundamental characteristics of this scenario. First, 
the Association is small and concerns itself with the well-being of a 
 
46 Id. at 12. 
47 See Holy Cross v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 455 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. La. 2006). 
See generally Politics, HELP HOLY CROSS, http://www.helpholycross.org/politics/ (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
48 See Holy Cross, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 532. 
49 See id. 
50 Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2009). 
51 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6908 (2009). 
52 See Recent Accomplishments, TUL. ENVTL. L. CLINIC, 3, http://www.tulane.edu 
/~telc/accomp.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) (“On October 6, 2006, the court in Holy 
Cross Neighborhood Association, Louisiana Environmental Action Network, and Gulf 
Restoration Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers . . . enjoined the Corps[’] . . . plan to 
dredge contaminated sediments from the Industrial Canal in New Orleans and to dispose 
of them in the Mississippi River and adjacent wetlands.”). 
53 Id. 
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specific neighborhood.54 Second, the size of the Association enables 
individual members to play a greater role, notifying other members of 
problems that affect the quality of life in the neighborhood. An 
individual member understands his role in the Association to exceed 
membership in a social organization. Instead, protecting the 
neighborhood from environmental threats likely rises to the level of 
duty to protect the member’s home. The Industrial Canal, where the 
Corps dredged toxic substances, is contiguous with the Holy Cross 
neighborhood. Individual Association members observed the activity 
and raised the issue with the Association. Third, the Association’s 
members saw the Corps’ dredging as significant enough to fight in 
court.55 The members perceived their obligation to contest the project 
as one that extended to the federal courthouse. The scale of the 
neighborhood organization and the immediacy of its focus suggest 
that it differs from “organized groups or random collections.”56 
It is important to note that, even if a neighborhood association had 
not existed, the same progression from individual moral duty to group 
action could have occurred. Neighborhood residents could have 
contacted other neighbors in the area and notified them of the 
environmental problem. Although the transaction costs would have 
been higher in the absence of the Association, concerned citizens 
could have reacted to the problem in a manner analogous to Held’s 
subway passengers by recognizing immediate options to stop the 
problem, which could include litigation to challenge the 
 
54 A Holy Cross Neighborhood Association Newsletter explains: 
[C]arbon neutrality refers to achieving net zero carbon emissions by balancing a 
measured amount of carbon released with an equivalent amount sequestered or 
offset. Best practice for organizations and individuals seeking carbon neutral status 
entails reducing and/or avoiding carbon emissions first so that only unavoidable 
emissions are offset. 
 The term can refer to the practice of balancing carbon dioxide released into the 
atmosphere from burning fossil fuels, with renewable energy that creates a similar 
amount of useful energy, so that the carbon emissions are compensated, or 
alternatively using only renewable energies that don't produce any carbon dioxide. 
 . . . Being carbon neutral means that our community recognizes its contribution to 
global warming and takes responsibility to offset its carbon footprint or the effect 
of greenhouse gas emissions, so that our activities will not contribute to global 
warming. 
News from the Lower Ninth Ward Center for Sustainable Engagement and Development, 
HOLY CROSS NEIGHBORHOOD ASS’N NEWSL. (Holy Cross Neighborhood Ass’n, New 
Orleans, La.), Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 1, 1, available at http://davidrmacaulay.typepad.com 
/HCNANEWSLETTER_SeptemberOctober2008.pdf. 
55 Yolanda Carrington, Hopes for Holy Cross, 34 S. EXPOSURE, no. 2, 2006 at 10. 
56 HELD, supra note 4, at 97. 
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environmentally damaging actions. Held has suggested that the line is 
blurry when one attempts to impose individual moral responsibility 
on members of the two types of groups discussed here: the line 
between an unorganized collection of citizens as opposed to a small 
citizens’ group in which members share decision making.57 A 
citizens’ group, like Held’s subway passengers, would not conclude 
that the duty to bring such a legal challenge depended on the 
likelihood of success.58 
E. Individual and Group Moral Obligations 
The foregoing discussion leads to certain conclusions regarding 
individual practices a person may adopt to decrease greenhouse gas 
emissions. Alongside such individual practices remains the more 
problematic question of whether a moral obligation exists, not just to 
change one’s personal practices, but to raise legal challenges in 
response to actions that exacerbate climate change. Without question, 
such duty would impose on individuals a moral obligation several 
orders of magnitude greater than adopting constructive individual 
practices. 
Individual practices to reduce greenhouse gases are usually simple 
and require little expenditure of time or effort other than a willingness 
to alter one’s behavior in a minor way. In fact, the change in behavior 
may result in savings or some other advantage. Additionally, the 
likelihood that an individual practice will decrease carbon dioxide 
emissions by some measure is high. Finally, the increment of benefit 
to the environment that results from such acts, taken individually, is 
low. Although such individual acts on a mass scale would benefit the 
environment tremendously, the collective action problem suggests 
that the likelihood of mass participation is low. 
Nevertheless, we should conclude that citizens possess a moral 
obligation to adopt such individual practices. The consequentialist 
view—that the increment of benefit is so infinitesimal as to be 
meaningless—makes little sense in the end. This is true for several 
 
57 E-mail from Virginia Held, Distinguished Professor, The Doctorate-Granting Inst. of 
the City Univ. of N.Y., to Christopher Brown, Assistant Professor, Tex. State Univ. (Oct. 
9, 2009, 15:53 EDT) (on file with author). 
58 A neighborhood organization would be subject to organizational standing 
requirements in federal court or state jurisdictions employing the federal standard, whereas 
a simple grouping of individuals would file and establish standing as individuals. See Hunt 
v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (outlining the separate 
federal standard for Article III standing for organizations). 
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reasons. First, in the context of a gas that distributes around the globe 
quickly and originates from endless sources, it becomes meaningless 
to say that any decrease in carbon dioxide is too small to do any good. 
There is no real threshold below which a reduction of carbon dioxide 
becomes irrelevant. Second, that most of the world’s governments 
prefer to measure carbon dioxide on a per capita basis reminds us that 
each individual contributes to the problem. The collective action 
problem should not prevent one from acting on a moral obligation. 
Third, if one accepts the concept of collective responsibility, one 
cannot escape the conclusion that a United States citizen bears a 
disproportionate responsibility for the climate crisis. Finally, given a 
problem so vast, acting within one’s personal sphere to reduce the 
problem must constitute a moral obligation. The deontological view 
makes better sense. 
Any purported moral duty to participate in the legal system to 
combat climate change involves very different considerations. Most 
obviously, the scenario this Article envisions depends on the concept 
of group moral responsibility that some philosophers have posited: 
individuals bear a moral responsibility as a group to act in concert 
with their community to combat an environmental threat. Because this 
sequence of events depends on group action, it differs qualitatively 
from the duty an individual citizen possesses to decrease carbon 
dioxide emissions. 
Further, if a citizens’ group litigates, it undertakes a time-
consuming and expensive process with an uncertain result. Despite 
the argument just discussed as to the moral responsibility a group of 
people arguably possesses when confronted with actions that damage 
the environment, common sense may suggest that such a moral 
obligation exceeds any realistic view of moral obligations. Several 
considerations contradict such a conclusion. 
First, the laws most obviously available to citizens as a means of 
challenging government actions that exacerbate climate change—the 
public trust doctrine or statutory citizen suit provisions—seek to 
protect the interests of citizens in commonly held resources. The 
existence of such laws does not mean that citizens’ groups bear a 
moral obligation to avail themselves of such remedies. However, 
when natural resources face increased risk, the fact that these laws 
protect commonly held resources suggests an increased responsibility 
to consider whether litigation would mitigate damage wrought by 
climate change. 
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Second, the obligation of a citizens’ group to avail itself of such 
laws becomes even more important in light of unpredictable 
government action that requires sustained consistent action. Scholars 
such as Sheldon Kamieniecki, who examine corporate influence on 
environmental decision making, pinpoint climate change as one area 
in which concerns about the cost of limiting carbon dioxide emissions 
have generated powerful corporate opposition.59 Federal agencies will 
find themselves subject to the same pressures they face in current 
environmental permitting and rulemaking. The time-sensitive nature 
of the climate problem makes it critical to combat erratic 
environmental policy through litigation. 
Professor Richard Lazarus recognizes that, because subsequent 
generations will bear the brunt of this generation’s actions with regard 
to climate change, legal and regulatory action in the present should 
contemplate possible governmental actions in the future.60 Lazarus 
observes that subsequent legislation or regulation could weaken or 
eliminate such protections altogether despite the need for a sustained 
effort on this issue.61 Lazarus’s article proposes mechanisms that 
could be incorporated into the law to combat relaxations or repeals of 
climate change laws, missed deadlines for achieving carbon emission 
reductions, and other future actions that could render legislation 
ineffective.62 Citizen litigation can act in tandem with the mechanisms 
Lazarus outlines to fight for consistency in climate change policy. 
Third, a successful citizen suit could have a different impact than 
the efforts of individuals to change their daily habits to decrease 
carbon emissions—not in the ultimate sense of solving the problem—
but nevertheless significant. In an environmental context other than 
climate change, for example, the Holy Cross litigation discussed 
above changed the course of an entire government project that 
threatened an estuary. In the climate change context, a successful 
citizen suit on this scale would still constitute a tiny increment in 
addressing the problem, but far greater than the individual practices 
just discussed. 
 
59 See SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, CORPORATE AMERICA AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: 
HOW OFTEN DOES BUSINESS GET ITS WAY? 179–96 (2006). 
60 See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining 
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1210–11, 1226 (2009). 
61 Id. at 1156. 
62 See id. at 1184–87 (discussing statutory mechanisms to employ in this generation’s 
climate change laws to protect future generations). 
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Massachusetts v. EPA was a qualitatively different citizen suit that 
involved state and local governments alongside nongovernmental 
entities and private parties as plaintiffs. It far exceeded the scope of a 
suit brought by a small neighborhood organization.63 Nevertheless, 
Massachusetts underscores the kind of impact citizens can have on 
the mitigation of climate change. 
The deontological view would prevent citizens from refusing to 
undertake litigation because of its uncertain outcome: the moral 
necessity of the act rests on a preexisting set of duties rather than on 
the possible result, coupled with the possibility of a significant 
outcome. 
Fourth, the assertion of such a moral obligation rests on a well-
established principle in the United States that affirmative obligations 
are an important attribute of citizenship. In the end, this Article 
speaks to an individual’s moral obligations apart from, or in addition 
to, the obligations of citizenship. However, even if one examines this 
issue from the perspective of citizenship, times of higher obligation 
clearly exist. In an indirect sense, the struggle to serve on juries 
exemplifies such an understanding of citizenship. The first of the 
Reconstruction Acts abolished the exclusion of African Americans 
from jury service.64 Congress viewed jury service—an affirmative and 
time-consuming duty—as a civil right rather than a form of 
conscription. Citizenship would be incomplete without this right. At 
our critical point in history, one’s right to enter the courthouse door—
not as a juror, but a litigant—should be understood as a duty to 
combat a grave ecological threat. 
Fifth, characterizing citizen litigation to combat climate change as 
a moral duty rests on an understanding that one’s obligations increase 
during critical historical moments. Citizens have been called upon to 
make unusual sacrifices for the good of the country. Victory gardens 
provide a familiar example.65 By 1943, twenty million Americans had 
embraced the task of growing such gardens as a duty and had 
managed to produce approximately nine to ten million tons of home-
grown produce.66 If nothing else, this Article has outlined on an 
 
63 See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
64 First Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). 
65 Claudia Reinhardt, Victory Gardens, WESSELS LIVING HIST. FARM, 
http://www.livinghistoryfarm.org/farminginthe40s/crops_02.html (last visited Nov. 19, 
2010). 
66 Id. 
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international, national, and state level that the world now faces such a 
critical historical period. 
Sixth, scientific certainty should not stand in the way of the 
adoption of individual or group moral responsibility for which this 
Article proposes. The precautionary principle discussed above should 
apply to individual and group responsibility to mitigate damage to the 
environment. 
In conclusion, as Professors May and Held argue, a group can bear 
collective moral responsibility for acts that occur in its midst. Actions 
exacerbating climate change arguably require a response from the 
community. In those situations, Americans should employ whatever 
legal means available to combat climate change. Because the outcome 
of litigation is uncertain and the incremental benefit to the 
environment impossible to calculate, the duty to include litigation 
among the range of actions one takes to combat climate change 
cannot rest on the outcome. The duty to resort to legal remedies arises 
from the preexisting duties an American has by virtue of her 
country’s history, continuing policies, and impacts on poorer nations. 
Without regard to outcome, the deontological view of moral 
obligation compels one to take action up to and including litigation. 
Even if such a moral duty to participate in the legal system exists, 
fundamental qualifications akin to the doctrine of impossibility 
clearly apply. If an individual’s lack of time and resources preclude 
the possibility of pursuing a complex and expensive legal remedy, 
and if she has no way to join together with others who also see the 
destruction of a natural resource as a result of climate change, it 
becomes difficult to assert the existence of a moral obligation to do 
something beyond a person’s reach. Similarly, no moral obligation 
can exist if no legal remedy exists to challenge the environmentally 
damaging act. It is difficult to assert that a person has a moral 
obligation to pursue a remedy that does not exist. 
Because this Article asserts that one’s moral obligations in light of 
climate change include the use of litigation where necessary, the issue 
of available legal remedies assumes a great deal of importance. The 
next section of this Article evaluates legal theories that may provide 
citizens with the ability to act on the moral obligation to pursue legal 
remedies if necessary. 
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II 
CARRYING OUT THE MORAL OBLIGATION: 
LEGAL REMEDIES TO COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE 
A. For Now, a Crisis Without a Federal Statutory Remedy 
The preceding section proposed that the nature and extent of moral 
obligations change in part based on whether exceptional historical 
circumstances exist. If that is true, the ecological crisis that climate 
change presents has heightened the moral obligations in our period of 
history, certainly in the United States. The rough sketch based on 
reliable data is enough, especially in light of the precautionary 
principle. Only in a historical period like our own does it make sense 
to conclude that citizens have a moral obligation to combat climate 
change, both through individual practices and, if necessary, litigation. 
How one might use litigation to combat climate change remains 
unanswered. 
It makes no sense to posit the existence of a moral obligation to 
pursue legal remedies against a problem if no such remedies exist. 
Any legal approach one takes to decreasing greenhouse gases will 
apply existing theories to unprecedented facts. Statutory claims 
against emitters of greenhouse gases or the federal or state agencies 
that regulate them may come into existence in the foreseeable future. 
At least on the federal level, however, specific statutory remedies that 
would enable citizens to seek redress for such damages to natural 
resources remain to be seen. 
First, despite pending rulemakings, a citizen suit under the Federal 
Clean Air Act to challenge carbon dioxide emissions that exceed 
federal limits does not yet exist. The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has initiated rulemakings under the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) for both mobile and stationary sources in the aftermath of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,67 which held that 
carbon dioxide fit the definition of “air pollutant” as the CAA defines 
the term for mobile sources in 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (“any air pollution 
agent or combination of such agents . . . substance or matter which is 
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air”).68 The Court 
concluded that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it 
refused to determine whether carbon dioxide could reasonably be 
“anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” under 42 U.S.C. § 
 
67 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
68 Id. at 556. 
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7521(a)(1).69 Finally, the Court concluded that the EPA had erred by 
failing to ascertain whether the agency possessed a duty to regulate 
carbon dioxide as an air pollutant reasonably anticipated to endanger 
the public welfare as provided by 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).70 
On remand, the EPA proposed a Finding of Endangerment to the 
effect that “greenhouse gases in the atmosphere [from mobile 
sources] endanger the public health and welfare of current and future 
generations” because of climate change.71 As enacted, this rule 
determined (1) that “atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases 
endanger public health and welfare within the meaning of [42 
U.S.C.A § 7521(a)(1)];”72 (2) that carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride 
constitute the most dangerous greenhouse gases; and, (3) that 
emissions from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines 
contribute to the danger to public health, safety, and welfare under 42 
U.S.C.A § 7521(a)(1).73 The agency also promulgated a Proposed 
Rule that would increase mileage standards for certain categories of 
vehicles in the 2012 through 2016 model years.74 The EPA 
promulgated both the endangerment finding and mileage rules on 
December 15, 2009.75 
Several months before the notices for the mobile sources rules 
appeared, the EPA had issued a rule establishing mandatory reporting 
of greenhouse gases from broad categories of stationary sources, 
which laid the groundwork for establishing emissions standards for 
any future stationary sources regulation.76 
 
69 Id. at 532–34. 
70 Id. at 506–07, 529–35. 
71 Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (proposed Apr. 24, 2009) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454 
(proposed Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86 and 600). 
75 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496–66,546 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
76 Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,448–16,731 (proposed 
Apr. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 600, 1033, 1039, 
1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, and 1065). 
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Defining greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources as an 
endangerment to public health led to new rulemakings for stationary 
sources as well. Subsequent to the mobile sources rulemakings, the 
EPA proposed a rule under which a preliminary six-year phase would 
provide the EPA with time to establish temporary emissions limits for 
greenhouse gases under the CAA’s Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) standards, as well as for the minimum thresholds 
necessary for an operating permit under the CAA’s Title V.77 During 
the first six years, the EPA would take other “streamlining actions” as 
well to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions.78 During the sixth year, 
the EPA would propose new rules to establish thresholds with which 
facilities would follow to comply with PSD and Title V.79 
At a minimum, these rulemakings represent real progress by 
seeking to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA. The question 
arises whether these first steps by the EPA should lead to the 
conclusion that the agency will assume an effective role in 
forestalling climate change, and whether the agency’s role obviates 
the responsibility of individual citizens to do more than modify their 
individual life habits. One should bear in mind a few basic 
observations in response to this question. 
First, although the EPA has now issued its Finding of 
Endangerment, rules predicated on that finding do not yet exist, with 
the exception of modest requirements for increased fuel economy in 
certain categories of vehicles. 
Second, with respect to stationary sources, the new Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration standards would apply only to new or 
significantly modified facilities. (The standards to be developed for 
Title V operating permits would apply to large categories of emitting 
facilities.) The CAA defines “stationary source” as “generally any 
source of an air pollutant except those emissions resulting directly 
from an internal combustion engine for transportation purposes or 
from a nonroad engine or nonroad vehicle,”80 or as “any building, 
structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air 
 
77 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring, 74 
Fed. Reg. 55,292–55,365 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 
70, and 71). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 42 U.S.C. § 7602(z) (2006). 
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pollutant.”81 The proposed stationary source standards would not 
apply to the full breadth of stationary sources described here. 
Third, all of these rules are subject to legal challenges. Given the 
level of industry opposition to pending legislation in Congress to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions, administrative legal challenges 
and appeals seem almost certain. 
Fourth, because of the phase-in periods in the mobile and 
stationary source rules alike, any reductions in greenhouse gases as a 
result of the rules will not occur for many years. Under the stationary 
sources rule discussed here, the EPA would promulgate interim 
standards that would be in effect during the six years it will take for 
the agency to gather the information necessary to formulate more 
lasting rules. When one combines the phase-in times built into the 
rules with the delays caused by litigation, any gains from the 
proposed rules will be realized well into the future. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Massachusetts v. EPA, the planning and rulemaking 
necessary for the EPA to actively regulate greenhouse gases, even 
after enacting rules authorizing the agency to regulate greenhouse 
gases, will require significant time and resources.82 Climate change 
scientists warn that time is of the essence. As each year passes and the 
concentration of carbon dioxide grows higher, prospects for 
preventing concentrations with irreversible effects diminish.83 
Finally, and more generally, the EPA’s National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards, requiring the states to formulate State 
Implementation Plans, do not include carbon dioxide as a “criteria 
pollutant.”84 
For citizens seeking a legal means of challenging carbon dioxide 
emissions that result in damage to natural resources, the Clean Air 
Act does not yet provide a remedy, whether under the statute’s citizen 
suit provisions or otherwise.85 
 
81 Id. § 7411(a)(3). 
82 549 U.S. 497, 531 (2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2)). 
83 James Hansen, James Hansen on Climate Tipping Points and Political Leadership, 
SOLVE CLIMATE (July 15, 2009), http://solveclimate.com/blog/20090715/james-hansen       
-climate-tipping-points-and-political-leadership. 
84 The following are the criteria pollutants: sulfur dioxide, 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4, 50.5 
(2009); particulate matter, 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.6, 50.7, 50.13; carbon monoxide, 40 C.F.R. § 
50.8; ozone, 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9, 50.10, 50.15; nitrogen dioxide, 40 C.F.R. § 50.11; and 
lead, 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.12, 50.16. 
85 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7661 (2006). 
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Further, the prospects of a new federal energy statute that would 
create a citizen suit to challenge the emission of greenhouse gases 
remains in question.86 Prior to final negotiations in the House of 
Representatives in May and June 2009, the American Clean Energy 
and Security Act contained a citizen suit provision that would have 
enabled small neighborhood organizations or groups of citizens to 
challenge emitters of greenhouse gases that made incremental 
contributions to the ecological or physical damage caused by climate 
change.87 Section 336 of the Discussion Draft allowed a person to 
“commence an action when [he] has suffered, or reasonably expects 
to suffer a harm attributable, in whole or in part, to a violation or 
failure to act [in conformity with the preceding section].”88 
“Harm” in the draft version of the Act was defined as “any effect 
of air pollution (including climate change) currently occurring or at 
risk of occurring and the incremental exacerbation of any such effect 
or risk that is associated with a small incremental emission of any air 
pollutant . . . whether or not the risk is widely shared.”89 At the time 
of its passage, on or about June 26, 2009, this provision had been 
deleted after opponents decried the avalanche of frivolous lawsuits 
that would result, including from environmentalists.90 The Clean 
Energy Jobs and American Power Act bill went to the Senate and 
awaited consideration alongside the Senate version filed on 
September 30, 2009.91 On July 22, 2010, Senate Democrats gave up 
on efforts to develop a bill that incorporated the House and Senate 
versions.92 
The deleted language from the Clean Energy and Security Act 
provides insight into the problems confronting citizens who would 
 
86 Well-established federal citizen suits exist under the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376 
(2006), the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7661 (2006), and the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
87 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
88 Lucy Wheatley & Cyrus Frelinghuysen, Removal of “Citizen Suit” Provisions Eased 
Passage of ACES, GLOBAL CLIMATE L. BLOG (June 26, 2009), 
http://www.globalclimatelaw.com/2009/06/articles/climate-change-litigation/removal-of 
-citizen-suit-provisions-eased-passage-of-aces/. 
89 Id. 
90 See Lazarus, supra note 60. 
91 Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(introduced by Senators John Kerry and Barbara Boxer). 
92 Perry Bacon, Jr., Lack of Votes for Senate Democrats’ Energy Bill May Mean the 
End, WASH. POST, July 23, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content 
/article/2010/07/22/AR2010072203614.html. 
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litigate to combat the effects of climate change. First, the strong 
opposition that led to the deletion of the citizen suit provision reflects 
the incentives of those who seek uniformity and predictability from a 
federal law. The climate change bill that Senators Boxer and Kerry 
proposed—the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act—
similarly contained no citizen suit provision.93 Statutory suits that 
provide citizens at the local level with a means to oppose greenhouse 
gases frustrate one purpose of encouraging federal lawmakers to 
preempt local regulation and citizen participation.94 One consequence 
of this opposition to local initiatives in federal statutes is that citizens 
who seek legal remedies in the climate change context may find that 
federal citizen suit options are limited and that state statutory or 
common law remedies may assume greater importance. 
Second, the deleted language reflects recurring concerns as one 
seeks legal remedies for citizens seeking to combat the causes of 
climate change. The deleted provision includes both current and 
prospective harms as a basis for bringing suit: the would-be provision 
addressed harms “currently occurring or at risk of occurring” and a 
person who has “suffered, or reasonably expects to suffer . . . .”95 This 
deleted language contemplates the problem of prospective harms that 
will result from current emissions. Further, this language echoes 
recent federal decisions that have interpreted federal standing 
requirements to consider harms from climate change throughout the 
twenty-first century.96 The two federal decisions discussed in this 
Article also interpret standing in light of present and future harms 
from greenhouse gases.97 
Moreover, the citizen suit provision deleted from the energy bill 
seeks to address what quantity of excessive greenhouse gases should 
 
93 See Summary of the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (S. 1733) as Passed 
by the EPW Committee, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (Nov. 2009), 
http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/analysis/congress/111/summary-clean-energy-jobs-and 
-american-power-act. 
94 J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case 
of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (2007); Daniel P. Schramm, A Federal 
Midwife: Assisting the States in the Birth of a National Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade 
Program, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 78–82 (2008). 
95 Wheatley & Frelinghuysen, supra note 88. 
96 See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009); California v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Native 
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
97 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power 
Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (both discussing the environmental harms produced by 
greenhouse gases). 
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trigger legal protections for those affected by climate change. With 
regard to standing, for example, should a party be required to show 
that the requested relief would remedy the entire problem of global 
warming and, if such a grandiose standard is unworkable, what level 
of mitigation warrants judicial intervention? The deleted citizen suit 
would have created a remedy to respond to an “incremental 
exacerbation” of climate change–related risk “whether or not the risk 
is widely shared.”98 This incremental approach to reducing 
greenhouse gases also appears in the two federal climate change–
related decisions discussed below.99 One cannot predict when the 
EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gases from stationary sources will 
become effective or whether future violations of those rules will 
prove actionable. Equally uncertain is the prospect of a citizen suit 
provision in the final version of a federal energy bill. In the meantime, 
the time-sensitive nature of the climate crisis increases the risks of 
inaction.100 
The conclusion of this discussion is clear. Despite proposed and 
promulgated rules from the EPA—as well as pending legislation in 
Congress—the fundamental analysis applied in Connecticut v. 
American Electric Power Co.101 continues to apply. Connecticut, 
discussed at greater length infra, involved a public nuisance action 
that several states, a city, and private land trusts brought against coal-
fired power plants for carbon dioxide emissions.102 The Connecticut 
decision considered in part whether existing federal statutes had 
extensively addressed the issue of climate change and thereby 
displaced common law remedies for damages resulting from climate 
change.103 Connecticut cited extensive authority to establish that, for a 
federal statute to displace a common law remedy, the statute must 
speak directly to the problem and actually regulate it, citing for 
 
98 Wheatley & Frelinghuysen, supra note 88. 
99 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525–26 (requiring EPA to evaluate whether to 
regulate American car emissions. This will not by itself reverse global warming, but will 
provide redress to plaintiffs, and eliminating a discrete injury is sufficient). See also 
Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 347–49 (slowing or reducing carbon dioxide emissions from 
coal-fired electric plants satisfies redressability requirement for standing). 
100 See James Hansen, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Global Warming 
Twenty Years Later: Tipping Points Near (June 23, 2008), available at http://www 
.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/TwentyYearsLater_20080623.pdf (briefing before the House 
Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming). 
101 582 F.3d at 340–42. 
102 Id. at 314. 
103 Id. at 371–88. 
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example a “precise and comprehensive statutory damage remedy” that 
Congress had created with respect to maritime torts.104 
Mindful of this standard, the court of appeals considered federal 
statutes that had addressed climate change.105 The court of appeals 
concluded, however, that none of them imposed anything 
approximating a binding law or regulation with a present, binding 
effect on government or the private sector to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.106 
The CAA was a special case among these laws. As this Article has 
already mentioned, the EPA issued a Finding of Endangerment that 
the contribution of six greenhouse gases to climate change 
endangered the public health and welfare of this and future 
generations. Once enacted into a law regulating greenhouse gas 
emissions, this finding would lay the predicate for regulating these 
greenhouses gases from mobile sources. 
The court of appeals noted, however, that this finding would not 
pertain to stationary sources, the category of emitters in 
Connecticut.107 The agency would have to issue rules that made 
emissions of these greenhouse gases from stationary sources subject 
to regulation, such as, inter alia, placing these emissions on the 
National Ambient Air Quality List.108 Connecticut did not discuss the 
EPA rule purporting a six-year period for developing greenhouse gas 
standards and subsequent rulemaking; however, this two-part rule 
would provide no emissions limitations until an indefinite time in the 
future. Connecticut concluded that the EPA thus far had proposed 
rules that would regulate greenhouse gases, but the rules that would 
satisfy the standard for legislative displacement had just begun.109 
In discussing whether a court should construe Congress’s refusal to 
legislate mandatory standards as legislative intent to leave the issue 
unregulated, the Connecticut court cited Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee.110 As with the regulation of greenhouse gases, Congress 
had “enacted numerous laws touching interstate waters,” which 
included the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.111 In that case, 
 
104 Id. at 386. 
105 Id. at 375–88. 
106 Id. at 378–88. 
107 Id. at 376–79. 
108 Id. at 375–81. 
109 Id. at 381. 
110 Id. at 380–81. 
111 Id. at 330. 
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Illinois had alleged common law nuisance against the City of 
Milwaukee to reduce water pollution.112 Despite the existence of the 
federal statute, the Milwaukee court concluded that Illinois sought 
remedies outside the scope of those the statute provided.113 In 
concluding that federal statutes had not displaced the common law 
public nuisance claim, the court reached a conclusion precisely 
analogous to the holding reached by the Connecticut court: 
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations 
may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law nuisance. 
But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to 
appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public 
nuisance by water pollution.114 
This observation from Milwaukee applies not only to the public 
nuisance claims in Connecticut, but also to any common law or state 
law remedy that federal statutes have not preempted. Even if such 
statutory claims are enacted, the requirement that the statute provide a 
remedy that precisely addresses the plaintiff’s complaint may allow a 
citizen to invoke the common law if it better addresses the 
environmental damage at issue. 
Given the absence of federal rules or new laws to provide guidance 
on greenhouse gas regulation from stationary sources, this Article 
chooses to focus on the public trust doctrine, public nuisance, and the 
state environmental citizen suits that have evolved from that doctrine. 
Public nuisance has thus far played the most important role in 
successful suits against stationary sources; the public trust doctrine 
has received the most attention from academic observers as a 
paradigm for evaluating climate change. 
Any assessment of climate change issues in relation to these legal 
theories requires some speculation. However, considering climate 
change in this way anchors the issue in extant law rather than in 
speculation regarding statutory claims that do not yet exist. The 
states’ role in environmental and natural resource protection receives 
less attention than the federal role but is nonetheless critical. As Susan 
George et al. observe: 
Because state governments are closer than the federal government 
to the citizenry, they have a perspective on local environmental 
issues that federal officials, often hundreds or thousands of miles 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972). 
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away, do not. Similarly, citizens are often more likely than federal 
or state agencies to be sensitive to environmental degradation close 
to their homes. The recent growth of “grassroots” environmental 
groups is evidence of the citizenry’s healthy concern for local 
environmental problems, particularly the loss of biodiversity.115 
George’s first observation—that states have often been more 
effective than the federal government in enacting laws that protect 
wildlife116—has proven even truer in the context of climate change. 
Many states have been extremely active in seeking new laws to 
decrease greenhouse gas emission,117 to encourage conservation, and 
to create regional cap-and-trade agreements. Moreover, as this article 
reflects, states have proven instrumental in litigation designed to 
decrease greenhouse gas emissions. States acting as parens patriae 
have acted as lead plaintiffs in the most important climate change 
litigation to date, both under CAA citizen suit provisions in 
Massachusetts v. EPA,118 as well as under public nuisance in 
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.119 and North Carolina ex 
rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority.120 
George’s second observation—that grassroots citizens’ groups 
have also played an important role in addressing environmental 
problems121—constitutes the primary concern of this Article. Without 
question, citizens’ groups have already availed themselves of the 
courts to challenge greenhouse gas emissions.122 If individuals or 
groups of citizens are to act on our moral obligation to combat climate 
change, the courts should become a more viable alternative. In the 
absence of federal citizen suits, the need arises to analyze legal 
 
115 Susan George et al., The Public in Action: Using State Citizen Suit Statutes to 
Protect Biodiversity, 6 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (1997). 
116 Id. 
117 E.g., REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/home (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2010); Western Governors’ Initiative Focuses on Transportation Fuels, 
SOUTHEAST AGRIC. & FORESTRY ENERGY RESOURCES ALLIANCE (Oct. 20, 2008, 3:58 
PM), http://www.saferalliance.net/renewsouth/2008/10/western-governors-initiative-f 
.html. 
118 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–22 (2007). 
119 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 340–42 (2d Cir. 2009). 
120 North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 593 F. Supp. 2d 812 
(W.D.N.C. 2009), rev’d, No. 09-1623, 2010 WL 2891572 (4th Cir. July 26, 2010). 
121 George et al., supra note 115, at 4. 
122 See, e.g., Longleaf Energy Assocs. v. Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc., 681 S.E.2d 
203 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (exemplifying such attempts to use the courts to help reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions). 
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theories at the state level that offer a real chance of ameliorating 
climate change and its effects. 
Federal courts have provided exceptional guidance as to how a 
litigant should approach climate change. Citizens can learn a great 
deal from federal suits that states have brought in the last two years, 
as the subsequent discussion demonstrates. 
B. Climate Change and Litigation from a Citizen’s Perspective 
A real-life scenario helps illustrate the kinds of situations in the 
present or near future that communities will face and may cause them 
to become plaintiffs in a climate change–related suit. 
Members of the Biloxi-Chitimacha tribe in Terrebonne Parish, 
located in southeastern Louisiana, have seen their community 
seriously flooded in five of the last six years.123 The flooding has 
become more intense and extensive during the last decade.124 As the 
coast continues to erode and the wetlands continue to disappear, the 
tribe seeks both adaptive measures to cope with the impact of 
flooding, as well as mitigation to reduce the severity of storms in the 
future.125 
Citizens in this situation have certain facts at their disposal but 
uncertainties as to how they should proceed. Few cases involving 
climate change provide guidance. The community relies on a natural 
sense that climate change is damaging. Increased precipitation, 
intense storms, coastal erosion, loss of wetlands, and flooding are 
already occurring and will increase in Louisiana.126 
This Article suggests that citizens such as these bear a moral 
responsibility to combat climate change, not only by changing their 
personal habits, but also by resorting to our legal institutions. Two 
recent federal decisions that address climate change provide guidance 
in formulating a claim that involves the peculiar facts of damages that 
result from excessive greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, these 
federal decisions would provide guidance not only for similar cases in 
federal court, but also for cases brought in state court under a variety 
 
123 Sue Sturgis, As the Land Disappears, an Indian Tribe Plans to Abandon Its 
Ancestral Louisiana Home, GRIST.ORG (Oct. 7, 2009, 1:44 PM), http://www.grist.org 
/article/as-the-land-disappears-an-indian-tribe-plans-to-abandon-its-ancestral-louis. 
124 See Amy Heinzerling, Past Decade the Hottest on Record, EARTH POL’Y INST. (Jan. 
14, 2010), http://www.earth-policy.org/index.php?/indicators/C51/. 
125 See Sturgis, supra note 123. 
126 Id. 
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of theories. This Article considers public nuisance, the public trust 
doctrine, and state-level environmental citizen suits. 
C. Guidance for Citizens from the Federal Courts 
1. Massachusetts v. EPA 
Subsequent sections of this Article make clear that the standing 
requirement imposed on public trust suits or state environmental 
citizen suits varies by jurisdiction. Federal courts approach state cases 
with broader standing principles in a manner that reasserts the federal 
standards in defining the scope of review.127 
Nevertheless, to assess citizen standing in the states, one should 
first consider the approach taken by federal courts. This is first true 
simply because a number of states have adopted the federal 
standard.128 Second, the federal standard is stringent with regard to the 
harm that forms the basis for standing and is useful for analyzing how 
to argue prospective harm under a difficult test. Third, the Supreme 
Court’s approach to federal standing requirements in Massachusetts 
provides guidance as to how courts may approach other cases 
involving climate change, including on the issue of future harms. As 
such, the standing analysis in Massachusetts provides guidance, not 
only on standing, but on how to approach the concepts common to 
any climate change–related suit. 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,129 the Supreme Court articulated 
federal standing requirements under the Constitution’s Case or 
Controversy requirement: one must demonstrate a concrete and 
particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is 
fairly traceable to the defendant, and that a favorable decision will 
likely redress that injury.130 The requirement of imminent harm 
applies both to legal or prospective equitable relief,131 which subjects 
longer-term remedies to threatened harms in the short term. On its 
 
127 ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622–23 (1989). 
128 See, e.g., Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters of N. Am. Auth., 
Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 737 N.W.2d 447 
(Mich. 2007). 
129 504 U.S. 555, 562–64 (1992). 
130 Id. at 560–61; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210–11 (1995). 
131 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 284 (2003) (“To seek forward-looking, injunctive 
relief, petitioners must show that they face an imminent threat . . . .” (citing Adarand, 515 
U.S. at 210–11)). 
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face, the three-part federal standing requirement would appear to 
severely limit a court from considering prospective harms. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA132 was the 
first to interpret federal standing requirements in the context of 
climate change. In conducting its standing analysis, the Massachusetts 
court applied well-established precedent in a manner that 
comprehended the unique nature of the problem.133 With respect to 
harm, the Court considered both present and future damage to the 
environment from climate change.134 As to whether the harm could be 
fairly attributed to the defendant, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Court accepted the connection between the EPA’s refusal 
to undertake rulemaking on carbon dioxide and greater environmental 
harm.135 With respect to redressability, the Court accepted that, 
although incremental reductions in carbon dioxide from mobile 
sources in the United States would not solve the global climate 
change crisis, such reductions would mitigate it.136 The Supreme 
Court’s approach to standing in Massachusetts could have 
consequences for other types of climate-related claims as well. 
Massachusetts differed in fundamental respects from the kinds of 
citizen suits this Article addresses. The issue presented to the 
Massachusetts Court involved a specific issue of administrative law 
that carried with it a different standing test than that articulated in 
Lujan. Massachusetts concerned the EPA’s refusal to initiate a 
rulemaking that would result in the regulation of carbon dioxide 
emissions from mobile sources.137 The EPA asserted that Congress 
did not intend the agency to regulate carbon dioxide; that, in any 
event, carbon dioxide from American vehicles made a negligible 
contribution to the global problem;138 and, even if this contribution 
were significant, rulemaking on mobile sources would interfere with 
other agencies’ programs, such as the Department of Transportation’s 
automobile mileage program under the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration.139 
 
132 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 521–23. 
135 Id. at 523–24. 
136 Id. at 525–26. 
137 Id. at 560. 
138 549 U.S. at 528. 
139 Id. at 531–32. 
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The EPA also asserted that such a rulemaking would interfere with 
presidential diplomatic objectives and would lead to piecemeal (and 
presumably inconsistent) climate policies.140 In refusing to initiate a 
rulemaking, the EPA refused to determine whether carbon dioxide fit 
the CAA’s definition of an air pollutant in 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (“any 
air pollution agent or . . . agents . . . substance or matter which is 
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air”).141 Further, even if 
carbon dioxide met that definition, the EPA asserted that they lacked 
jurisdiction to determine whether carbon dioxide could reasonably be 
“anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” under 42 U.S.C. § 
7521(a).142 By refusing to make these findings, the EPA also refused 
to conclude that the agency possessed a duty to regulate an air 
pollutant reasonably anticipated to endanger the public welfare as 
provided by 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1).143 
The appellants, private parties as well as state and local 
governments, challenged the EPA under the CAA provision for 
judicial review of agency action, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).144 Although 
this provision carried with it an administrative standing requirement, 
the Massachusetts Court concluded that the petitioners had satisfied 
the higher requirements outlined in Lujan, supra: 
[I]t is clear that petitioners’ submissions as they pertain to 
Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards of the 
adversarial process. EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both 
“actual” and “imminent.”145 . . . There is, moreover, a “substantial 
likelihood that the judicial relief requested” will prompt EPA to 
take steps to reduce that risk.146 
The Court considered Massachusetts’ basis for standing sufficient, 
not only to satisfy the administrative standard, but also the test 
outlined in Lujan.147 
Because Massachusetts acted as the lead petitioner, whose injury 
served to establish standing for all the complaining parties, the 
 
140 Id. at 513–14. 
141 Id. at 528–30. 
142 Id. at 528. 
143 Id. at 510–14, 528–35. 
144 Id. at 514. 
145 Id. at 521 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
146 Id. (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 
(1978)). 
147 Id. 
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Supreme Court approached standing differently than in the case of a 
private litigant.148 A state need not establish individualized injury to 
the state as a plaintiff. The state need not own the flooded land or 
other damaged resources. Instead, as Justice Holmes declared, a state 
“has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in 
all the earth and air within its domain. [A state] has the last word as to 
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its 
inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”149 
Nevertheless, the Massachusetts Court identified the state’s status 
as a landowner as an independent basis for standing.150 This 
proprietary basis for standing proves relevant to other kinds of 
litigants in the climate change context. “Massachusetts does in fact 
own a great deal of the ‘territory alleged to be affected’ [which] only 
reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this case . . . 
warrant[s] the exercise of federal judicial power.”151 
That is, the State of Massachusetts owned “a substantial portion of 
the state’s coastal property,”152 which, at the time of the litigation, had 
already suffered concrete, particularized harm. “According to 
petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits, global sea levels rose somewhere 
between 10 and 20 centimeters [3.9–7.9 inches] over the 20th century 
as a result of global warming [and] have already begun to swallow 
Massachusetts’ coastal land.”153 
A persuasive argument for private litigants seeking to rely on the 
Massachusetts Court’s approach to standing therefore emerges: even 
though the Court’s conclusion that Massachusetts possessed standing 
in part as parens patriae, the state’s status as a landowner who had 
suffered injury to real property also played a large role in the Court’s 
standing determination.154 
The discussion thus far has focused on the plaintiffs’ actual, 
present damages. However, the Court’s willingness to recognize 
future harms as a basis for standing permeates the decision. The 
analysis for each form of damages followed the same pattern: first a 
 
148 Id. at 518. 
149 Id. at 518–19 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) 
(describing Georgia’s interest in bringing suit to prevent air pollution originating outside 
its borders)). 
150 Id. at 522–23. 
151 Id. at 519. 
152 Id. at 522 (citing affidavit of expert witness for Massachusetts). 
153 Id. at 522 (citing petitioners’ affidavits) (conversion to inches added). 
154 Id. at 526. 
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consideration of present-day manifestations of harm, then an 
evaluation of the same harm as it increases through the coming 
decades of the twenty-first century. 
Before reaching the harms specific to the state of Massachusetts, 
the Court considered present harms on a global level as they extend 
into the future.155 The Court first summarized the “serious and well 
recognized” harms associated with climate change that have already 
occurred in the course of the twentieth century: the global retreat of 
mountain glaciers, reduction in snow-cover extent, rivers and lakes 
melting earlier in the spring, and rise in sea levels.156 The Court noted 
that soil compaction, recurrent storms, and sea level rises already 
destroy twenty to thirty square miles of wetlands in Louisiana every 
year.157 
Once the Court established the climate change-related harm that 
had already occurred, the Court accepted the “strong consensus” of 
“qualified scientific experts” that the damage to date “only hints at the 
environmental damage yet to come.”158 The Court cited studies 
predicting a precipitate rise in sea levels, severe and irreversible 
damage to ecosystems, significantly reduced water storage in 
snowpack with serious economic consequences, increased spread of 
disease, and more ferocious hurricanes from increased water 
temperatures by the end of the twenty-first century.159 The Court 
characterized these global harms—both to date and projected decades 
into the future—as “widely shared” risks.160 
After the Court proceeded to discuss the damage to Massachusetts 
as a landowner to date, the Court relied on expert affidavits to 
conclude that “[t]he severity of that injury [to Massachusetts as a 
landowner] will only increase over the course of the next century.”161 
Periodic storm surges and flooding events could destroy all or part of 
fifty-three coastal parks, beaches, reservations, wildlife sanctuaries, 
and the infrastructure associated with each, the Court observed.162 
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One official predicted the “loss of roughly 14 acres of land per miles 
of coastline by 2100.”163 Further, state officials predicted that the rise 
in sea level in the twenty-first century will transform a 10-year flood 
into the equivalent of a 100-year flood and a 100-year flood into a 
500-year flood.164 The Court noted that remediation costs alone could 
cost hundreds of millions of dollars.165 
The manner in which the Court related future damages to the 
present determined the way it assessed whether Massachusetts had 
suffered both “actual” and “imminent” harm for purposes of 
standing.166 If the Court could root specific climate-caused 
environmental damages in the future to present events, and if a 
“strong consensus” of “qualified scientific experts” predicted the 
same types of damages would grow through the twenty-first century 
as global warming increased, future harms became “imminent.”167 
For an environmental plaintiff in a state that has adopted federal or 
similar standing requirements, Massachusetts provides tremendous 
guidance. First, because of the strong scientific consensus regarding 
the environmental damage that climate change causes, Massachusetts 
provides strong precedent for state courts hearing citizen suits to 
acknowledge the connection between global occurrences and local 
damages without identifying an immediate, local source of the harms. 
Second, the Massachusetts Court approached the “actual or 
imminent harm” element of standing in a manner that allowed it to 
consider long-term prospective harm.168 The Court first considered an 
extant harm: the loss of coastline due to increased sea level.169 The 
Court then treated this current manifestation of climate change as a 
harbinger of harms that experts project for the coming decades.170 The 
Court considered expert evidence in this regard that extended until the 
end of the twenty-first century.171 The term “imminent” in the federal 
standard received an expanded meaning because the nature of the 
harm required it. 
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States take different approaches to standing with regard to 
environmental citizen suits, suits based solely on the public trust, or 
suits in nuisance. If a litigant found himself in a jurisdiction that had 
adopted stringent federal standards, he might find it possible to 
approach standing in a manner similar to that of the petitioners in 
Massachusetts. This is so in part because many harms associated with 
climate change have already manifested themselves and will grow in 
the future, a grim reality that formed the basis for “actual and 
imminent harm” in the Massachusetts decision. 
Massachusetts’ approach to standing has clear implications for 
climate change—related cases involving different facts. In a case 
challenging a western state’s decision to divert water from a stream, a 
community dependent on the river might follow the pattern 
Massachusetts established to argue “actual or imminent harm.” First, 
provide evidence that climate change has already caused drought and 
decreased snow pack throughout the western states: authorities 
indicate that snowpack is now shrinking as much as twenty-five 
percent in the Cascades of the Northwest and fifteen percent in the 
snowfields of the Rocky Mountains, but arriving in the lowlands as 
much as a month earlier than usual.172 Second, present evidence 
specific to the disputed river showing decreased flow resulting from 
decreased snowpack and further loss in the foreseeable future. In 
standing terms, this shows actual, concrete harm specific to the 
natural resource.173 Third, offer evidence that drought, decreased 
snowpack, and alteration of river flows are all predicted for the 
western United States in the coming decades.174 The Massachusetts 
decision would recognize this evidence as showing future harms, but 
“imminent” for purposes of standing because these harms have 
already manifested themselves. 
All three forms of evidence described would help establish “actual 
and imminent harm.” In addition to the support such evidence would 
lend to standing, showing prospective harm could also influence the 
extent to which the court’s remedy takes into account future 
generations. 
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Finally, Massachusetts answered the question of redressability in 
the context of climate change: whether a court-ordered remedy must 
reduce some minimum quantity of greenhouse gases—or some 
minimum of climate-caused damages—before it will serve to redress 
the plaintiff’s injury.175 The EPA asserted that it could have no 
statutory duty to engage in rulemaking with respect to greenhouse 
gases because a rule limiting greenhouse gas emissions from mobile 
sources in one country would have no appreciable impact on climate 
change globally, especially given burgeoning emissions from other 
countries such as China and India.176 The Court rejected this 
argument, concluding that the reductions that would result from 
American restrictions on mobile source emissions required the EPA 
to act: 
Because of the enormity of the potential consequences associated 
with man-made climate change, the fact that the effectiveness of a 
remedy might be delayed during the (relatively short) time it takes 
for a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an older one is essentially 
irrelevant. Nor is it dispositive that developing countries such as 
China and India are poised to increase greenhouse gas emissions 
substantially over the next century: A reduction in domestic 
emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no 
matter what happens elsewhere.177 
The Court’s reasoning here really contains two elements. First, the 
Court relied on the traditional principle that a genuine increment of 
benefit can be sufficient to establish redressability.178 And second, the 
Court referred to the enormity of the “potential consequences 
associated with man-made climate change….”179 This is a duty-based 
argument, which this Article refers to as a deontological basis for 
combating climate change. The enormity (in its traditional meaning of 
“huge evil”) of what we have done compels us to reduce the harms of 
climate change by whatever increment we can. The willingness of the 
Court to accept incremental reductions of greenhouse gases as proof 
of redressability, and to premise this conclusion in part on a moral 
duty to act, proves valuable to plaintiffs in other legal contexts who 
seek to reduce greenhouse gases or their effects. 
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In the absence of specific EPA rules extending carbon dioxide 
regulation to stationary sources, the Massachusetts decision alone has 
not yet resulted in successful state-level challenges to the permitting 
of stationary carbon dioxide sources. In Longleaf Energy Associates 
(Longleaf) v. Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc. (Friends), Longleaf, 
an electric utility, sought a preconstruction permit for a coal-fired 
electric power plant.180 The challenged permit contained no 
restrictions on carbon dioxide.181 In opposing the permit, Friends cited 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Massachusetts that carbon dioxide 
was an air pollutant subject to regulation under the CAA.182 Friends 
concluded from this holding that the permit should have contained 
emissions limitations on carbon dioxide as part of New Source 
Review.183 After Georgia’s environmental protection agency 
approved the permit, Friends sought review from an administrative 
law judge, who affirmed the agency’s decision.184 After the lower 
court reversed the administrative law judge’s decision, the Georgia 
Court of Appeals reinstated it, concluding that Massachusetts did not 
require stationary source carbon dioxide standards and that the EPA 
had not created them: 
This ruling was not required by the CAA or the decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, and would impose a regulatory burden on 
Georgia never imposed elsewhere. It would compel the EPD to 
limit CO2 emissions in air quality permits, even though no CAA 
provision or Georgia statute or regulation actually controls or limits 
CO2 emissions, and even though (to this Court’s knowledge) no 
federal or state court has ever previously ordered controls or limits 
on CO2 emissions pursuant to the CAA. It would preempt ongoing 
Congressional and EPA efforts to formulate a CO2 emissions policy 
for all the states, and require the EPD to invent in a vacuum CO2 
emission controls for permits. If accepted, it would engulf a wide 
range of potential CO2 emitters in Georgia—and Georgia alone—in 
a flood of litigation over permits, and impose far-reaching economic 
hardship on the State.185 
As already discussed, the EPA has now considered stationary 
source regulations for carbon dioxide and begun to promulgate such 
rules. But standards specific enough to satisfy the Longleaf court do 
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not and will not exist for a number of years. Longleaf illustrates the 
restrictions that face citizens’ groups who challenge carbon dioxide 
emissions from stationary sources through existing air quality statutes 
and regulations: if neither the federal CAA nor state air quality 
statutes require permits to contain greenhouse gas restrictions, it 
seems unlikely that contesting a permit will succeed. Legal 
approaches that do not rely on rules that define emissions limitations, 
such as those considered in subsequent sections of this Article, prove 
necessary to obtain relief. 
In Texas, a prominent citizens organization challenged the state 
environmental agency’s failure to recognize carbon dioxide as an air 
pollutant as defined in the state’s own air quality rules.186 The plaintiff 
contests the issuance of several permits to construct several new coal-
fired electric plants on this basis, and also seeks a declaratory 
judgment that public interest witnesses have standing to testify at 
public hearings on such permits.187 The Texas suit differs in certain 
respects from the claims at issue in Longleaf; its outcome remains 
uncertain.188 
A recent and striking decision—Connecticut v. American Electric 
Power Co.189—elaborates on the approach the Supreme Court took to 
standing in the Massachusetts decision, but does so in the context of a 
public nuisance claim against coal-fired electric plants. 
2. Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company 
In Connecticut, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s approach to standing when 
given facts peculiar to climate change. The court also provided a more 
in-depth legal justification for finding standing.190 Connecticut 
receives extended treatment here because it speaks to so many issues 
pertinent to citizen-initiated greenhouse gas litigation. 
But Connecticut did more than confirm and deepen the Supreme 
Court’s standing approach to suits involving climate change. By 
applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in an administrative issue 
under the CAA to a tort suit for public nuisance, the court of appeals 
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changed the legal landscape for those seeking legal remedies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.191 This section of the Article 
considers Connecticut in some detail because it addresses a number of 
issues pertinent to citizens litigating to combat climate change. 
Obviously, Connecticut arose under federal rather than state public 
nuisance law, which requires an interstate dispute and the need for a 
single legal decision to impose a consistent standard for multistate 
parties.192 Nevertheless, Connecticut is striking because it provides 
guidance for plaintiffs with or without an interstate dispute, especially 
since most states apply the same or similar public nuisance standards 
as the federal courts derive from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.193 
This section will primarily analyze the Connecticut court’s 
consideration of existing federal statutes to determine if existing 
statutory remedies displace public nuisance claims, its standing 
analysis based on Massachusetts, and its evaluation as to whether 
private parties had stated a claim in public nuisance upon which relief 
could be granted. What emerges from this discussion is clear: at this 
stage in our country’s history, at least, no statutory remedy poses an 
obstacle to a common law claim for equitable relief where 
environmental damages result from climate change. Connecticut helps 
articulate the basis for a private suit in state common law nuisance. 
a. Nature of the Case 
In Connecticut, Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, New 
Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin (states) joined with 
New York City and three private trusts that owned lands managed as 
nature preserves open to the public.194 These plaintiffs sued six 
electric power corporations, whose fossil-fuel fired plants in twenty 
states collectively emitted twenty-five percent of the carbon dioxide 
from the nation’s electric power sector and ten percent of the overall 
carbon dioxide emitted each year by the United States.195 These plants 
generated 2.5% of the world’s greenhouse gases.196 The plaintiffs 
urged that these emissions constituted a public nuisance under federal 
law, defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821(B) as “an 
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unreasonable interference with a right common to the general 
public.”197 
b. Justiciability, Briefly 
The court of appeals rejected the lower court’s conclusion that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs had failed to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.198 The district court 
had concluded the claims were nonjusticiable under Baker v. Carr.199 
The district court believed that considering the plaintiffs’ claim would 
drag the district court into Baker’s political thicket based on two 
factors that case articulated. First, the case could not be decided 
without an initial policy decision from the executive or legislative 
branch of government as to the balance between environmental, 
economic, and national security issues.200 Second, the district court 
also concluded that ascertaining the appropriate caps on the 
defendants’ carbon dioxide would require legislative consideration.201 
A case that raised such policy issues could not be resolved by 
“judicial fiat.”202 
The Second Circuit analyzed the case under each of the six 
considerations outlined in Baker, and concluded that neither the 
district court nor the defendants had articulated political question 
considerations that would preclude review.203 Baker cautioned first 
and foremost that the judiciary should refrain from cases where the 
text of the Constitution evinced a clear commitment of the issue to 
another branch of government,204 which the court of appeals did not 
find on the climate change issue.205 
The court of appeals also rejected the defendants’ assertion that 
fashioning a judicial remedy would involve “complex, inter-related 
and far-reaching policy questions” as to the causes and most 
appropriate response to national and global climate change.206 The 
court of appeals observed that reducing emissions from power plants 
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in six states did not require the formulation of an entire policy to 
address climate change.207 Further, Supreme Court decisions did not 
prohibit courts from considering issues that touched upon foreign 
policy but did not interfere with it; Congress and the Executive 
branch had both concurred that greenhouse gas emissions should be 
reduced, so interference with those branches was unlikely.208 
Additionally, American climate change policy lacked a clear 
objective, which made it difficult to ascertain with what policy a legal 
decision would interfere.209 
As to the argument that climate change is a legislative issue 
because courts lack the institutional competence to resolve such cases, 
the Second Circuit discussed precedent reaching back a hundred years 
in which federal courts interpreted complex data in multistate public 
nuisance cases involving all forms of pollution.210 The court of 
appeals concluded that courts were not only competent to resolve 
such disputes but uniquely qualified to do so.211 
The Connecticut court’s discussion of justiciability bears relevance 
to the future of climate change policy and litigation. Obviously, 
because the U.S. Supreme Court will review this decision, the success 
of Connecticut’s justiciability analysis will determine whether the 
aspects of the opinion involving private litigants will survive. Further, 
both Massachusetts and Connecticut have done much to further the 
country’s regulation of climate change and indicate that the judiciary 
should continue to play a role in this process. 
c. Standing of States and Private Trusts 
The Connecticut court carefully analyzed the different standing 
requirements imposed on states, cities, and private parties to bring a 
public nuisance claim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.212 In doing 
so, the Connecticut court approached the factual allegations unique to 
climate change suits in the way the Supreme Court did in 
Massachusetts. Beyond that, Connecticut elaborated on the legal 
reasoning that supported its standing analysis.213 This section will 
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explain Connecticut’s conclusions with regard to each of three 
categories of plaintiffs, but will focus especially on the private parties. 
With regard to the states in the lawsuit, the Connecticut court first 
alluded to the discussion in Massachusetts, both of parens patriae and 
a state’s proprietary standing as a landowner.214 Connecticut 
determined that the states had established parens patriae standing by 
asserting their quasi-sovereign interests in protecting the citizens of 
their respective states from the injuries resulting from increased 
carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere that will eventually 
affect the entire populations of each state.215 
The states further asserted standing on the basis that they each 
owned substantial amounts of real property that would suffer harm 
from increased carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere, as in 
Massachusetts.216 The private land trusts also asserted standing on the 
basis of their status as real property owners,217 an issue to be 
discussed infra. 
(i) Standing Requirement of Harm 
Consistent with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,218 Connecticut 
emphasized that actual or imminent injury could not amount to 
speculation, conjecture, or hypothesis.219 Such injury must be 
impending, immediate, and not “remote or speculative.”220 The court 
of appeals’ discussion reflected the fact that the plaintiffs sought 
injunctive relief and therefore contemplated the prevention of future 
injury.221 
In assessing imminent injury, the Connecticut court faced the same 
dilemma that confronted the Massachusetts court: whether, based on 
scientific evidence that global warming will seriously damage the 
natural and human environments, a plaintiff can argue that damages 
projected to occur throughout the twenty-first century are 
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“imminent.”222 A second question is whether the damage is more 
imminent if it has already begun to manifest itself.223 
As already discussed, the Massachusetts Court concluded that 
damages predicted to occur decades in the future could be considered 
as “actual or imminent” harm now.224 The Connecticut court 
agreed.225 With regard to current injury, the states cited the following: 
[I]ncrease in carbon dioxide levels that has already caused the 
temperature to rise and change their climates; devastating future 
injury to their property from the continuing, incremental increases 
in temperature projected over the next 10 to 100 years; and 
increased risk of harm from global warming, including an abrupt 
and catastrophic change in climate when a “tipping point of 
radiative forcing is reached.”226 
As one example of current injury, the states cited the steady 
decrease in California snowpack, a process already begun, that causes 
flooding and decreases the water supply of Californians.227 The states 
then projected on the basis of scientific opinion that this harm would 
increase in the coming decades.228 With respect to this current harm 
projected to grow worse in the future, the Connecticut court explicitly 
acknowledged the approach to actual or imminent harm the Supreme 
Court took: 
In Massachusetts, the State alleged that coastal erosion caused by 
global warming constituted a current injury to its property. The 
Court held that this erosion sufficed as an allegation of 
“particularized injury in [Massachusetts’] capacity as a landowner,” 
and served as a harbinger of injuries to come: “The severity of that 
injury will only increase over the course of the next century.”229 
Similarly, the destruction of California property wrought by the 
flooding associated with the earlier-melting snowpack qualifies as a 
current injury-in-fact for Article III purposes.230 
Connecticut then exceeded the Massachusetts Court’s approach when 
it accepted future harms as a basis for standing without rooting them 
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in current harms.231 The states alleged a broad array of future damages 
from climate change that would occur within the next ten to one 
hundred years.232 First, the coastal states would suffer extensive harm 
from the rise in sea level, both to urban areas and wildlife habitat: 
The bulk of the States’ allegations concern future injury. For 
example, those Plaintiff States with ocean coastlines, including New 
York City, charge that a rise in sea level induced by global warming 
will cause more frequent and severe flooding, harm coastal 
infrastructure including airports, subway stations, tunnels, tunnel 
vent shafts, storm sewers, wastewater treatment plants, and bridges, 
and cause hundreds of billions of dollars of damage. In addition, 
they assert that some low-lying public property would be 
permanently inundated unless protective structures are built, with 
the cost falling heavily on those coastal Plaintiffs. Further, a rise in 
sea level would salinize marshes and tidelands, destroy habitat for 
commercial and game species, migratory birds, and other wildlife; 
accelerate beach erosion; and cause saltwater intrusion into 
groundwater aquifers.233 
Plaintiff states located along the Great Lakes would suffer from the 
opposite problem, lower water levels: 
Global warming threatens Plaintiff States bordering the Great Lakes 
with substantial injury by lowering the water levels of the Great 
Lakes, which would disrupt hydropower production. Warmer 
temperatures would threaten agriculture in Iowa and Wisconsin and 
increase the frequency and duration of summer heat waves with 
concomitant crop risk. Global warming will also disrupt ecosystems 
by negatively affecting State-owned hardwood forests and fish 
habitats, and substantially increase the damage in California due to 
wildfires.234 
The land trusts also alleged future harms, including the permanent 
inundation of low-lying properties, the salinization of marshes, and 
destruction of other habitats, including for birds.235 Climate change 
would also seriously harm their ability to preserve ecologically 
significant and sensitive land for scientific and educational purposes 
as well as for human enjoyment.236 
Conspicuously, neither the states nor the trusts rooted these future 
harms in already-manifested harms. When the defendants objected 
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that these future harms lacked temporal proximity to the alleged 
nuisance and failed the “imminent” harm standing requirement, the 
Second Circuit observed that Lujan required temporal proximity to 
increase the probability that the future harm would actually occur. 237 
The court of appeals accepted Connecticut’s assertion that the future 
harms were “‘certain to occur because of the consequences, based on 
the laws of physics and chemistry, of the documented increased 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.’ There is no probability 
involved.”238 
The Connecticut court accepted both the current and future harms 
the states and trusts alleged to establish the first prong of standing, 
injury in fact.239 
(ii) Standing Requirement of Causation 
The Connecticut court concluded that the plaintiffs’ injuries were 
fairly traceable to the defendants because their emissions contributed 
to global warming, citing decisions that required only that one trace 
the defendant’s conduct to the plaintiff’s harm.240 The court of 
appeals also cited authority for the proposition that a facility’s 
emissions are fairly attributable if they contribute to the harm 
plaintiffs suffer.241 Further, the Connecticut court cited Public Interest 
Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,242 in 
which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that showing plaintiff’s 
injuries to be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct does not 
mean that plaintiffs must show, to a scientific certainty, that the 
defendant’s effluent, and defendant’s effluent alone, caused the 
precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs.243 
Finally, for purposes of causation in its standing analysis, the 
Connecticut court rejected the argument that, because the defendants 
collectively emitted 2.5% of the world’s carbon dioxide, they played a 
de minimis role in the injury plaintiffs suffered. The Connecticut 
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court concluded that the harm defendants inflicted was best left to 
“the rigors of evidentiary proof at a future stage of the 
proceedings….”244 The court of appeals also observed that 
“[t]ellingly, in Massachusetts’ discussion of causation, the Court 
rejected EPA’s argument that ‘its decision not to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions from new motor vehicles contributes so insignificantly 
to petitioners’ injuries that the agency cannot be haled into federal 
court to answer for them.’”245 
The court of appeals accepted plaintiffs’ argument that their harm 
was fairly attributable to defendants’ actions that had exacerbated the 
problem incrementally.246 
(iii) Standing Requirement of Redressability 
The defendants relied on two primary arguments: First, that the 
emitters who caused the alleged harm greatly exceeded those named 
as defendants.247 Second, the defendants urged that whatever 
negligible increment of reduction in greenhouse gases that would 
result from the case would not provide the plaintiffs with relief, an 
argument familiar from Massachusetts.248 The Connecticut court 
rejected both.249 
Defendants first argued that federal law prevented redress where 
independent parties not named in the suit bore responsibility for the 
injury; in this case, a multitude of emitters.250 In rejecting that 
proposition, the court of appeals noted that the case upon which 
defendants relied involved tax incentives for hospitals that provided 
emergency care to indigents.251 In that case some of the plaintiffs had 
not sued the hospitals that had actually denied them care, so it was 
impossible to know which plaintiffs had suffered injuries requiring 
redress.252 No such dilemma existed in the Connecticut case. 
Second, defendants urged that the relief plaintiffs sought would 
offer no relief to them.253 Plaintiffs argued that caps should be 
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imposed on major emitters of carbon dioxide, such as defendants, and 
those caps should be reduced by a specified percentage each year for 
at least a decade in order to reduce the risk of the harms plaintiffs 
alleged.254 Defendants responded that global warming would continue 
regardless of reductions in emissions that defendants might 
achieve.255 
The Connecticut court rejected this argument, noting that the Court 
in Massachusetts had found that slowing or reducing global warming 
by some increment constituted redress.256 Massachusetts had 
redressability for purposes of standing, and Connecticut had relied on 
its holding.257 As in Massachusetts, Connecticut concluded that an 
incremental reduction in greenhouse gases as a result of judicial 
intervention was enough to establish redressability.258 
d. Federal Common Law Nuisance: Stating a Claim 
The Connecticut court next considered whether the states, local 
government, and private land trusts had stated claims in federal 
nuisance law.259 With respect to the states, cases relied upon by the 
court of appeals largely involved claims involving water pollution or 
other nuisances in which the actions of one state harmed the citizens 
of another.260 Under such circumstances there is an “overriding 
federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or where the 
controversy touches [upon] basic interests of federalism . . . .”261 The 
court assessed whether the states, acting in their parens patriae and 
proprietary roles, satisfied the elements of federal common law 
nuisance in their attempt to sue polluters in other states.262 As 
discussed below, the Connecticut court not only concluded that the 
states had stated a claim, but also that the local government and 
private land trusts had done so as well.263 Because this Article focuses 
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on private parties, the court of appeals’ analysis of the private land 
trusts will receive special focus. 
The Connecticut court relied heavily on concepts drawn from the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts as the accepted authority on public 
nuisance.264 In particular, the Connecticut court relied on § 821B(1), 
which defines a public nuisance as an “unreasonable interference” 
with a “right common to the general public.”265 Section 821B(2) 
explains further: 
Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a 
public right is unreasonable [may] include the following: 
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with 
the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public 
comfort or the public convenience, or 
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by statute, ordinance or 
administrative regulation, or 
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a 
permanent and long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or 
has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public 
right.266 
The court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs had articulated a 
public nuisance under these principles coupled with the federal 
common law principles just discussed.267 In its discussion, the court of 
appeals noted that public nuisance theory does not require a plaintiff 
to show an immediate harm, in part because nuisance contemplates 
equitable relief that becomes effective before the harm occurs.268 
Of specific interest to this Article is the court’s application of the 
Restatement’s nuisance principles to the private land trust plaintiffs. 
Section 821C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts articulates 
requirements for private parties who seek to bring public nuisance 
claims: 
(1) In order to recover damages in an individual action for public 
nuisance, one must have suffered harm of a kind different from that 
suffered by other members of the public exercising the right 
common to the general public that was the subject of the 
interference. 
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(2) In order to maintain a proceeding to enjoin to abate a public 
nuisance, one must 
(a) have the right to recover damages, as indicated in 
Subsection (1), or 
(b) have authority as a public official or public agency to 
represent the state or a political subdivision in the matter, or 
(c) have standing to sue as a representative of the general 
public, as a citizen in a citizen’s action or as a member of a 
class in a class action.269 
The court of appeals emphasized the necessity of distinguishing a 
private citizen who suffered a “harm of a different kind from that 
suffered by other persons exercising the same public right” from the 
multitude who also suffered harm.270 Failing to do so would flood 
defendants with lawsuits for the same nuisance. 
The court of appeals also noted, however, that ascertaining whether 
a plaintiff’s damages differ qualitatively from other citizens who have 
suffered harm is relevant, citing comment c to § 821C of the 
Restatement, which observes that “[d]ifference in degree of 
interference cannot, however, be entirely disregarded in determining 
whether there has been difference in kind.”271 The Restatement 
comment used the example of community members who all use the 
same road; a person who uses the road a dozen times a day will have 
a special reason for doing so that will distinguish him from other 
community members who use the road once a day.272 Although it is 
the same use, the difference in degree does distinguish the frequent 
driver as uniquely harmed.273 
The court of appeals accepted the land trusts’ articulation of a 
public right: 
The Trusts assert that the public rights at issue in this case are “the 
rights to use, enjoy, and preserve the aesthetic and ecological values 
of the natural world.” Their complaint provides specific examples 
of how the ecological value of the properties they own will be 
diminished or destroyed by global warming, and alleges that they 
suffer “special injuries, different in degree and kind from injuries to 
the general public.”274 
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In assessing whether the land trusts articulated a public nuisance, the 
court of appeals returned to § 821B(1) to assess whether the trusts had 
alleged that the coal-fired electric plants had unreasonably interfered 
with a public right, as already outlined in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. The court of appeals accepted the land trust’s reasoning that the 
coal-fired electric plants substantially and unreasonably interfered 
with public rights: “[t]he Trusts have asserted that Defendants’ carbon 
dioxide emissions, ‘by contributing to global warming, constitute a 
substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights including, 
inter alia, the rights to use, enjoy, and preserve the aesthetic and 
ecological values of the natural world.’” 275 
The court then accepted the trusts’ second basis for alleging 
substantial interference: 
The Trusts have also asserted that “Defendants know or should 
know that their emissions of carbon dioxide contribute to global 
warming, to the general public injuries such warming will cause, 
and to plaintiffs’ special injuries,” and that “Defendants and their 
predecessors in interest have emitted large amounts of carbon 
dioxide from the combustion of fossil fuels for at least many 
decades.” These statements are sufficient to allege that Defendants’ 
conduct was “of a continuing nature,” as well as that it has already 
produced a “permanent or long-lasting effect….”276 
D. Massachusetts and Connecticut: 
Guidance for State Court Citizen Litigation 
The Connecticut case incorporated Massachusetts’ approach to 
evaluating factual allegations of harm to establish standing from 
Massachusetts, but also accepted predictions of damages strictly in 
the future.277 In the subsequent discussion of state legal theories, one 
should remember that state requirements for standing often differ 
from the federal requirements because they evolved under different 
constitutions. 
But Connecticut developed legal approaches to climate change 
much further. First, the court of appeals acknowledged a non-
statutory claim against stationary sources because no federal statutory 
remedy yet displaced the common law.278 In addition, although 
precedent existed for public nuisance claims by private parties against 
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traditional air polluters, applying such precedent to greenhouse gas 
emissions created a wholly different legal context for private parties 
litigating to reduce greenhouses gases.279 Connecticut also suggests 
the possibility of litigating under state environmental statutes to 
oppose a broad range of environmental harms without the restrictions 
imposed by the Federal Clean Air Act.280 One important example of 
this: the public nuisance plaintiff does not sue by demonstrating 
exceedances of permitted emissions levels. Instead, the plaintiff seeks 
to establish that the facility emits a significant quantity of carbon 
dioxide that contributes by some increment to climate change, and the 
court can accept that increment as contributing to public nuisance 
without a quantity defined by statute. 
This Article has considered the Connecticut case in detail. 
However, the powerful effect of Massachusetts has resulted in other 
decisions that resemble Connecticut: private tort claims for the 
damages that greenhouse emissions cause. In Comer v. Murphy Oil 
USA, for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held 
that landowners on the Gulf Coast had stated justiciable claims for 
nuisance, trespass, and negligence against oil and energy 
companies.281 
Looking to Massachusetts and Connecticut as guidance on how to 
approach the issues unique to climate change, at least three state 
theories present themselves as possible approaches: the public trust 
doctrine, statutory environmental claims closely tied to the public 
trust doctrine, and public nuisance. 
III 
THESE FEDERAL DECISIONS FRAME CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES 
FOR CITIZENS’ STATE–LAW CLAIMS 
A. Public Nuisance 
For state public nuisance cases, which do not involve parties in 
several states and the need for a federal court to render a decision that 
all the states will recognize, state public nuisance law clearly offers 
promise for citizen suits to challenge carbon dioxide emissions or 
decisions that exacerbate them. 
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First, the Connecticut decision provides tremendous authority for 
the proposition that a private party may bring a public nuisance claim 
for carbon dioxide emissions under the standards articulated in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The discussion from the Restatement 
as to whether a would-be plaintiff suffered qualitatively different 
injuries than others who endured the nuisance is useful: if the 
nuisance destroys natural resources upon which the plaintiff relies, 
this can help to establish standing.282 For example, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 821C describes a private plaintiff who has 
suffered damages qualitatively different than others who suffered the 
same nuisance: “11. A pollutes public waters, killing all of the fish. B, 
who has been operating a commercial fishery in these waters, suffers 
pecuniary loss as a result. B can recover for the public nuisance.”283 
The Restatement comment also suggests that individuals who 
suffer a severe degree of the harm—a community hit harder by a 
storm or a drought than others—can establish standing on that 
basis.284 The Biloxi-Chitimacha tribe of Terrebonne Parish of 
southeastern Louisiana mentioned earlier would serve as an example. 
Although many Louisiana residents suffered the same floods that the 
tribe did, its members could allege that yearly floods destroying the 
entire community constitute a greater harm by degree that justifies 
standing. 
Second, the Connecticut decision—especially its discussion of 
standing and the private land trusts—offers by far the best guidance 
for a state-level public nuisance suit, since a majority of states apply 
the same Restatement principles as the federal courts.285 This relative 
uniformity gives public nuisance an advantage in terms of 
predictability that public trust doctrines and state environmental 
citizen suits do not. Many states have accepted public nuisance claims 
involving air pollutants not explicitly regulated by statute.286 Further, 
state courts have concluded that public nuisance suits control over 
administrative claims even where state air quality statutes provide no 
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specific guidelines and clearly regulate the pollutant in question.287 
No displacement or preemption exists, so the common law remedy is 
valid. It is unlikely that state regulatory agencies have adopted 
greenhouse gas standards other than overall emissions caps. If no 
such standards exist, Connecticut supports the viability of public 
nuisance claims against other private parties or municipalities 
emitting carbon dioxide.288 
Third, the fact that public nuisance focuses on prospective relief to 
avert the nuisance also suggests that a court evaluating such a claim 
would have a basis for issuing injunctive relief to mitigate future 
climate-related harms. A private plaintiff who takes the approach to 
imminent and future harm outlined in Massachusetts and Connecticut 
will benefit from the prospective approach that public nuisance takes. 
Finally, precedent already exists for successful claims against 
carbon dioxide emitters under public nuisance. Connecticut is a 
landmark case for the proposition that public nuisance principles 
apply to present and future damages that greenhouse-gas-induced 
warming causes. Yet Connecticut only goes so far as to establish that 
plaintiffs in such cases can have standing and state a claim. In North 
Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, a federal 
district court found a carbon dioxide emitter liable under public 
nuisance.289 For private plaintiffs, public nuisance may offer a 
realistic approach to challenging actions that exacerbate climate 
change. 
B. Public Nuisance, the Public Trust Doctrine, 
and Environmental Citizen Suits: A Close Relationship 
The public trust doctrine, a concept arising out of property law, and 
public nuisance, a tort-based principle, share a close relationship in 
the protection of natural resources. One who pollutes a public trust 
resource violates the public trust, as does the state for failing to 
prevent the pollution, but the polluter also creates a public nuisance 
by substantially interfering with a public right. Example 11 from 
section 821C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, provides 
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one example: if the fish population killed by the public nuisance 
dwelled in waters protected by the public trust, the public trust 
doctrine itself could establish the existence of a public right for a 
public nuisance claim.290 This interrelationship between the two 
doctrines proves relevant in the subsequent discussions of common 
law remedies for the harms of climate change. 
Suits in which private citizens sue in public nuisance to protect 
public trust resources—in Wisconsin, for example—demonstrate the 
close relationship between the doctrines.291 The ability to protect a 
public trust resource by relying on public nuisance means that the 
plaintiff is not confined to challenging state actions that compromise 
the public trust in some way. Emissions external to public trust 
resources can be challenged in ways that the public trust doctrine 
alone, in most jurisdictions, cannot reach. 
Joseph Sax observed that, aside from the public trust doctrine, 
“[p]ublic nuisance law is the only likely doctrinal competitor” for a 
legal remedy enabling citizens to protect publicly held natural 
resources. That approach, however, is encrusted with the rule that 
permits lawsuits to be initiated only by the state attorney general, and 
not by private citizens.”292 
In drafting the Michigan Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), Sax 
drew on public trust and public nuisance principles to create an 
environmental statutory tort.293 Given the clear tendency to expand 
the participation of private parties in public nuisance litigation, Sax’s 
reticence regarding the doctrine should diminish. Sax was influential 
in the states that drafted environmental citizen statutes. The tort-like 
provisions in those state statutes, as well as in the Michigan statute 
Sax helped to draft, echo public nuisance principles. As Alexandra B. 
Klass observes about the Michigan statute, which many other states 
used as a model for similar legislation: “MEPA empowers the 
judiciary to create a common law of environmental quality that goes 
beyond existing state statutes or regulatory requirements in a manner 
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similar to that developed under the common law of nuisance or other 
torts.”294 
This Article considers the interaction between the public trust 
doctrine, public nuisance principles, and state environmental citizen 
suits in the context of citizens who seek to respond to climate change. 
Such claims can draw on the previously discussed federal Connecticut 
decision for guidance. 
IV 
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine: 
Relevance to Climate Change Litigation 
The public trust doctrine bears direct relevance to the ethical 
implications of climate change for individual citizens and the 
existence of a moral duty to challenge a public or private entity that 
exacerbates climate change. Many effects that the United States has 
already begun to experience—coastal erosion, wetlands destruction, 
flooding, and drought—damage aquatic resources the public trust 
protects. 
The plethora of articles and scholarly texts that address the public 
trust doctrine renders one more account superfluous. An 
oversimplified version is adequate: that the state holds in trust for its 
citizens certain natural resources, including some wildlife, submerged 
lands, navigable streams, the oceans, and their shores.295 Further, the 
state bears responsibility to maintain such natural resources for 
human uses such as navigation, fishing, or recreation.296 As each state 
came into existence it assumed the responsibility from the federal 
government to protect public trust resources. Each of the fifty states 
and the federal government interpret the nature and scope of the 
public trust differently and change their interpretations over time.297 
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States such as California and Hawaii have extended their public trust 
doctrines to offer the broadest protections to natural resources.298 The 
public trust doctrine imposes both a legal and ethical duty on the state 
to protect such natural resources and human uses of them. Harm to 
public trust resources could result from a number of public or private 
actions; for example, a state’s decision to lease or sell public trust 
lands or to allow private parties to damage such lands.299 
The Massachusetts and Connecticut decisions could strengthen a 
public trust case based on damage from increased greenhouse gas 
concentrations. The public land trust plaintiffs in Connecticut argued 
that present and future harms to their lands would impair their 
biological diversity as well as nature education on the grounds.300 
These damages correspond to the public trust focus on natural 
resources as well as uses.301 Further, the land trust plaintiffs in 
Connecticut argued that the court should consider such damages to 
land and human resources in the future to establish standing and the 
elements to state a claim now.302 Given that the public trust doctrine 
focuses on the current protection of natural resources and uses for 
posterity, the Connecticut decision should strengthen the argument 
that damages to public trust resources in the future should support a 
claim in the present. 
If one analyzes the potential of a state’s public trust doctrine to 
help citizens mitigate or adapt to climate change, a few characteristics 
stand out. 
1. The State Says What Constitutes the Public Trust 
First, given the tremendous range of interpretations the states have 
given to the public trust, the doctrine could form the basis of a 
challenge to damaging practices in one state but not another.303 Just 
one example illustrates this problem. The State of Texas restricts 
litigation to protect the public trust to the state; essentially no standing 
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for individual citizens exists.304 The State of Hawaii not only grants 
standing to citizens to protect the public trust but includes all natural 
resources in the state and the ability to challenge water quality 
permits the state issues under a delegated program.305 Whether the 
public trust doctrine can provide a remedy for citizens opposing 
climate change is definitely a question of geography and jurisdiction. 
2. Public Trust Resources Need Protection from Remote Pollutants 
Second, in order to play a mitigating role, a state’s public trust 
doctrine would likely need to consider damage to public trust 
resources that result from pollutants originating outside public trust 
land or water. A few examples illustrate why such an approach would 
play a vital role. 
A preliminary example can be seen in the relationship between a 
public nuisance claim and the public trust. A prima facie public 
nuisance claim requires unreasonable interference with a public right. 
The commonly held right in public trust resources could constitute the 
public right to challenge greenhouse gas pollution from remote 
sources, as in the federal Connecticut decision. 
The question arises whether the states’ diverse iterations of the 
public trust doctrine, standing alone, could state a claim for damages 
caused by remote sources that increase greenhouse gas 
concentrations. Traditionally, a state decision to alienate or damage 
public trust resources can form the basis for a claim. These decisions 
concern the public trust resources themselves, and not state decisions 
to permit a source of emissions remote from the navigable stream or 
coastline. The federal Connecticut decision, however, instructs that 
state permitting decisions concerning remote sources should not 
escape public trust scrutiny. Such emissions contribute to drought, 
species loss from drought, and loss of snowpack that affects rivers. In 
a sense, California’s protection of tributaries that fed Mono Lake, and 
which did not enjoy public trust protection prior to the Mono Lake 
decision, illustrates the same point.306 The natural resources that feed 
or damage the public trust should be considered, given that state 
environmental statutes do not yet include greenhouse gases, much less 
damage to public trust resources that result from them. 
 
304 Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 175 S.W.2d 410, 413–14 (Tex. 1943). 
305 HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9. 
306 See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709 
(Cal. 1983). 
 448 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 385 
Some states have included the air itself as one of the resources 
protected by the public trust doctrine. Hawaii, New Mexico, Oregon, 
and South Dakota have all declared air as a public trust resource 
subject to its protection.307 Professor Gerald Torres has argued 
persuasively that public trust principles should apply to the air as a 
resource.308 Wider acknowledgment of the air as a public trust 
resource could give rise to litigation limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions as damage to a commonly held resource. 
3. The Public Trust Should Provide Protection Independent from 
State or Federal Administrative Standards 
In a famous 1983 decision—National Audubon Society v. Superior 
Court (the Mono Lake case)—the California Supreme Court expanded 
the state’s public trust doctrine to include water rights and ecology.309 
That decision recognized two distinct public trust doctrines: the 
government’s common law duty to “take the public trust into account 
in the planning and allocation of water resources” and with regard to 
fish and wildlife as public trust resources.310 The different approach 
California has taken to these two different public trust doctrines 
illustrates the need for a doctrine independent of state or federal 
statutory standards. While this example speaks to adaptation more 
than mitigation, it points out the need for an independent public trust 
doctrine for mitigation and adaptation alike. 
In Environmental Protection Information Center v. California 
Dept. of Forestry and Fire Protection,311 the California Supreme 
Court explained that these two public trust doctrines differed in scope. 
With respect to fish and wildlife, “[the courts] will look to the statutes 
protecting wildlife to determine if DFG or another government 
agency has breached its duties in this regard.”312 California courts 
interpret the public trust protecting fish and wildlife as coextensive 
with the duties the statute imposed on the appropriate agencies.313 
Citizens have the right to bring public trust challenges with regard to 
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wildlife, provided they sue the agency charged with the statutory 
duty.314 If state law or regulation fails to account for damage to fish or 
wildlife from climate change, no real remedy exists. 
By contrast, the National Audubon Society decision recognized an 
agency’s statutory duty to allocate water rights, but that this statutory 
duty did not 
render the judicially fashioned public trust doctrine superfluous. 
Aside from the possibility that statutory protections can be repealed, 
the noncodified public trust doctrine remains important both to 
confirm the state’s sovereign supervision and to require 
consideration of public trust uses [involving water] in cases filed 
directly in the courts without prior proceedings . . . .315 
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court concluded that the public 
trust doctrine formed an independent basis for challenging the 
diversion of public trust surface waters and even tributaries that fed 
those streams.316 In this context the National Audubon Society 
decision—and a similar holding in North Dakota317—suggest that the 
public trust doctrine can form an indispensable basis for challenging 
unwise water allocation decisions in a time of drastic shortage 
independent of the state’s prior appropriation rules. Claims citizens 
can bring to challenge the state’s allocation of natural resources are 
valuable in adapting to or mitigating climate change. California’s 
water public trust law can provide a tremendous mechanism to 
balance appropriative and ecological priorities when prolonged 
drought will create conflict. 
4. Barring Mitigation, the Public Trust Can Play an Adaptive Role 
Fourth, even if the public trust doctrine fails to play a mitigating 
role in a specific situation, the doctrine may be invaluable in 
developing adaptations to the harm that climate change has already 
created. In Avenal v. State, the Louisiana Supreme Court dramatically 
demonstrated the way a court can conclude that the protection of 
public trust resources outweighs the assertion of private property 
rights.318 In Avenal, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and 
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Fisheries (Louisiana Wildlife) wrote “hold harmless” clauses into 
oyster leases to avoid claims for damaged oyster beds in areas where 
the state was attempting coastal restoration.319 Louisiana Wildlife also 
gave lessors the option of relocating their operations to another area 
that the coastal restoration would not affect.320 Some of those who did 
not relocate sued Louisiana Wildlife in 1994, alleging that the state 
had taken property without compensation when the coastal restoration 
projects increased the salt content in the water and destroyed their 
oyster beds.321 The trial court awarded the lessors more than one 
billion dollars in damages for the lost oyster beds, and the court of 
appeals affirmed the decision.322 
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, affirming the validity of 
the “hold harmless” clauses in the leases, and that the statute of 
limitations (“prescription” in Louisiana) barred some of the lessors’ 
claims.323 Without question, the court’s decision had a plausible legal 
basis. Nevertheless, to reverse a billion-plus dollar verdict against a 
major industry in the state was a serious decision. In explaining its 
decision the court declared: 
The risks involved are not just environmental, but involve the 
health, safety, and welfare of our people, as coastal erosion removes 
an important barrier between large populations and ever-threatening 
hurricanes and storms. Left unchecked, it will result in the loss of 
the very land on which Louisianans reside and work, not to mention 
the loss of businesses that rely on the coastal region as a 
transportation infrastructure vital to the region’s industry and 
commerce. The State simply cannot allow coastal erosion to 
continue; the redistribution of existing productive oyster beds to 
other areas must be tolerated under the public trust doctrine in 
furtherance of this goal.324 
For the sake of argument, one should assume that the plaintiffs in 
Avenal were citizens who challenged a decision by Louisiana Wildlife 
to discontinue coastal restoration in order to accommodate oyster 
beds whose leases were legally defective. If a similar decision had 
been reached given this reversal of parties, the court’s rationale for 
allowing the restoration projects would exemplify Sax’s concept of 
identifiable, enforceable rights: as against a legally questionable 
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property right in oyster leases, the hypothetical citizens successfully 
asserted their right under the public trust to prevent the state from 
allowing the lessors’ commercial activity to damage a common pool 
resource. 
Strikingly, the Avenal decision involved threats that climate change 
poses to public trust resources: coastal erosion and loss of wetlands, 
and the resulting damage from these occurrences.325 The Avenal court 
recognized the need to continue restoration in light of climate-induced 
damages.326 
Current concentrations of greenhouse gases will require adaptive 
strategies even if the United States and the world community succeed 
in achieving major reductions.327 As a result, decisions such as Avenal 
that make adaptation possible are important. Other traditional public 
trust resource protections also have the potential to serve adaptive 
purposes. For example, prevention of physical damage to the bed and 
banks of navigable streams328 or simply the protection of the water 
supply could serve adaptive purposes. The wide range of protected 
public trust uses also increases the potential to bring litigation that 
serves an adaptive function: the loss of fishing, boating, or other 
recreational uses could influence the decisions states make with 
regard to resource allocation. 
As discussed previously, general environmental provisions in state 
constitutions have provided state legislatures with a basis for enacting 
freestanding citizen suit provisions. Such statutes enable citizens to 
challenge a broader range of government or private actions that harm 
natural resources than those the public trust doctrine protects. These 
statutes are sometimes referred to as protecting the public trust, but 
they actually draw on legal theories other than the public trust 
doctrine, such as public nuisance. 
B. Environmental Citizen Statutes: 
Effective if Independent from Other Environmental Regulations 
and Inclusive of Defendants Other than the State 
Approximately fifteen states have incorporated public trust 
principles into their constitutions or statutes to create environmental 
 
325 See generally id. (discussing costal erosion and loss of wetlands). 
326 Id. at 1107–08 n.28. 
327 MANN & KUMP, supra note 27, at 155. 
328 State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Wis. 1957) (involving physical 
damage to lake beds and banks of navigable streams). 
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causes of action for their citizens.329 Such environmental citizen 
statutes radically expand the natural resources subject to protection 
beyond those traditionally protected by the public trust. As with the 
public trust doctrine, however, some states have limited the scope of 
their statutes to protect against actions that violate state or federal 
environmental standards. The Louisiana statute, for example, equates 
“public trust” resources with “natural resources,” radically expanding 
the potential protections the statute can provide.330 At the same time, 
Louisiana’s statute limits citizen suits to violations of state 
environmental laws, which eliminates suits based on damage caused 
by greenhouse gases.331 
A number of states—New Jersey, North Dakota, Florida, Iowa, and 
Nevada, for example—go the way of Louisiana on this issue, 
restricting the plaintiff to suits for violations of statutes, rules, or 
regulations.332 Although these statutes often provide for a wide range 
of state and local governments—and sometimes private individuals or 
entities—as defendants, they will be unlikely to provide relief unless 
their environmental statutes can be construed to regulate greenhouse 
gases. 
Other environmental citizen statutes, however, apparently enable 
citizens to sue for environmental harms exceeding the scope of state 
or federal law.333 These statutes focus on damage to natural resources 
rather than statutory violations as the basis for bringing suit. 
Michigan’s environmental citizen suit provision, similar to those of 
Minnesota, South Dakota, Connecticut, and Indiana, enables “any 
person” to bring suit for the “protection of the air, water, and other 
natural resources and the public trust in these resources from 
pollution, impairment, or destruction.”334 A “person” under the 
Michigan statute can be an “individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, governmental entity, or other legal entity.”335 Minnesota 
 
329 George et al., supra note 115, at 14. 
330 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:640.3 (2010). 
331 Id. § 30:2026(A)(1). 
332 Nevada and New Jersey appear to have modeled their environmental citizen 
lawsuits on Michigan’s, but both require an imminent or actual statutory violation to 
establish standing. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.540–.570 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-
1 to -14 (West 2010). 
333 George et al., supra note 115, at 30–31, 33, 35 (listing the statutes for Connecticut, 
Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and South Dakota). 
334 Id. 
335 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.301 (2007). 
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defines the statutory right almost identically, but adds that the 
protected resources include those “publicly or privately owned.”336 
Some states have included language indicating that the person who 
sues under statute acts on behalf of the state or in the place of the 
state,337 somewhat analogous to a qui tam action. 
Without question, state environmental laws provide guidance in 
citizen suits. The environmental citizen statutes themselves, though, 
should not restrict plaintiffs to the standards defined elsewhere in the 
states’ laws. One might characterize such citizen suits as statutorily 
created environmental torts. Under provisions such as those in 
Michigan, Minnesota, South Dakota, New Jersey, and Indiana, the 
entity protected from tortious conduct consists of natural resources, 
defined in the broadest possible terms, and the tort consists of any act 
that “pollutes, impairs, or destroys” the natural resources of the state. 
The tort created in states such as Louisiana adds a fourth element: the 
tort must be committed in violation of a state environmental statute. 
As with public nuisance, the tort at issue in the Connecticut decision, 
eliminating the statutory violation as a requirement allows the 
plaintiff to focus on the harm to natural resources to establish 
damages without showing statutory noncompliance. Citizen statutes 
such as these could provide ground for challenging individuals, 
businesses, and local or state governments who exacerbate climate 
change. 
At least two jurisdictions—likely more among those with broad 
definitions of natural resources—explicitly evaluate alleged violations 
of state citizen suits for harm that state environmental regulations do 
not prohibit. The first is Connecticut, where the Connecticut 
Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), the environmental citizen 
statute, protects a broad range of natural resources: “The Attorney 
General [or] any person . . . may maintain an action in the superior 
court for the judicial district wherein the defendant is located . . . for 
the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural 
resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or 
destruction . . . .”338 
The statute provides for an extremely broad range of citizen 
plaintiffs and defendants. Connecticut courts have concluded that 
 
336 MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01–.13 (2005). 
337 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 297, at 68 (discussing Wisconsin state constitution in 
State v. City of Oak Creek, 605 N.W.2d 526, 541 (Wis. 2000)). 
338 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-16 (2009). 
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allegations state a claim under CEPA if they show “a colorable claim 
of conduct resulting in [unreasonable] harm to one or more of the 
natural resources of [Connecticut].”339 
The question is how one shows harm. In Mateo v. Mann, the 
plaintiff brought suit under CEPA to stop a neighbor from pumping 
effluent into the plaintiff’s wetlands, thereby increasing phosphorous 
concentrations to a level that endangered the wetlands’ survival.340 
The defendant sought to dismiss the case on the basis that no federal 
or state standards existed to demonstrate that the effluent had 
damaged the wetlands.341 The court rejected the claim that no claim 
under CEPA in the absence of a previous administrative proceeding 
or standard and concluded that a plaintiff could establish a claim 
under CEPA by alleging facts satisfying the elements outlined in the 
statute, commenting that: 
[I]t would be anomalous to conclude that the legislature has, as a 
general matter, enacted in an environmental regulatory scheme that 
runs on two different tracks with respect to the same conduct: one 
that requires compliance with specific criteria promulgated by a 
regulatory agency … and a second that lodges in a court the 
determination of whether the same conduct comes within the very 
general standard of reasonableness….342 
The evidence the plaintiff produced directly to the court as fact finder 
clearly provided sufficient evidence in the absence of an agency-
determined standard. 
Similarly, under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act 
(MEPA), Michigan courts have consistently held that, in establishing 
that a defendant’s behavior “has or is likely to pollute, impair, or 
destroy the air, water, or other natural resources,” a trial court can 
either produce detailed fact findings based on testimony or rely on 
evidence that the defendant has violated an applicable environmental 
control statute.343 The ability to prove damages in court without first 
demonstrating the violation of a statute and exhausting administrative 
remedies makes such a statute invaluable in the climate change 
 
339 AFCO CT, L.L.C. v. Drake Petroleum Co., No. LLICV085003456S, 2008 WL 
4307613, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 2, 2008) (citing Fort Trumbull Conservancy, 
L.L.C. v. City of New London, 265 Conn. 423, 432 (2003)) (first alteration added). 
340 No. CV085022203, 2009 WL 1142581 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2009). 
341 Id. at *1. 
342 Id. 
343 Anglers of the Ausable, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 770 N.W.2d 359, 377 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2009) (citing Nemeth v. Abonmarche Dev., Inc., 576 N.W.2d 641, 648 (Mich. 
1998)). 
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context, where state standards for greenhouse gases likely do not 
exist. 
A final note on environmental citizen suits: one should note that 
Michigan’s environmental protection statute allows any person to sue 
a public or private entity to protect air, water, or other natural 
resources.344 The Michigan Supreme Court nevertheless applied 
federal standing requirements to a MEPA suit despite the absence of 
such standards developed from the Michigan constitution.345 Standing 
represents another barrier to citizen suits to combat climate change. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
In June 2009, the United States Global Change Research Program 
issued Global Climate Change: Impacts in the United States.346 This 
study assesses American and international climate change studies and 
offers possible outcomes for the United States in the coming decades. 
The study’s authors compare challenges that climate change poses 
with other environmental changes in human history.347 They conclude 
that the severity and speed of problems that climate change will cause 
bring into question whether human beings will adapt quickly enough 
to survive as a species.348 That comparing climate change–related 
challenges to earlier crises in human history could lead the authors to 
ask this question brings into sharp focus the unprecedented challenges 
our time faces. An unprecedented period in history compels an 
unprecedented moral duty as a citizen to do whatever possible to avert 
damaging consequences. 
Whether religious or secular, people have comprehended the moral 
dimension of such a widespread environmental crisis, citing the duty 
to preserve the complexity and beauty of nature, to acknowledge 
one’s role in contributing to the crisis, and to lessen the suffering of 
those in developing countries who will face hardship and death far 
greater than in developed countries. 
 
344 Id. at 378. 
345 Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 709 N.W.2d 
174, 210–11 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 
2007). 
346 U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 19. 
347 Id. at 26. 
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As this sense of moral duty to nature and other human beings 
becomes better defined, one asks whether a moral duty exists to take 
concrete action. On an individual, day-to-day level, a number of the 
measures one can take to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are so 
familiar that they become trivialized. Under a so-called 
consequentialist view, the likely good that an act will actually 
produce determines whether a moral duty exists to do it. In this view, 
the failure to cultivate individual habits that mitigate greenhouse gas 
accumulation entails no moral violation, since the benefit of each 
individual’s actions is infinitesimal. By contrast, the so-called 
deontological view looks at the morality of individual actions based 
on preexisting duties: in light of my status as an inhabitant of the 
single country most damaging to the environment in terms of climate 
change, in light of my responsibility to protect the beauty and 
complexity of the environment, in light of my obligation to alleviate 
suffering, I decide whether a moral duty exists to cultivate individual 
habits. 
The issue of moral duty does not stop with individual practices. 
Moral philosophers have argued that small groups of people can bear 
responsibility for failing to respond to harmful acts they witness. 
Professor Virginia Held uses the analogy of an assault on a subway 
that a group of passengers witness.349 When a neighborhood 
organization, a citizens’ group, or other small group witnesses the 
decline of natural resources around them, they arguably bear a similar 
responsibility to take action. Among these alternatives should be 
litigation to mitigate or adapt to climate change. One would normally 
balk at the idea that litigation could constitute a citizen’s affirmative 
duty. But normal assumptions do not apply in a time when such 
widespread and disastrous harbingers confront us. Though overly 
familiar, the examples of citizens fighting for the privilege to sit on 
juries for weeks at time, or millions of people growing gardens to 
support a war effort, provide a more accurate measure of the moral 
requirements imposed on people in a time like this. 
With respect to climate change, the immediate question becomes 
whether Americans face a right without a remedy. The EPA has only 
begun to propose rules that would eventually lead to greenhouse gas 
regulation and possible citizen suits under the Clean Air Act. 
Legislation containing provisions to limit greenhouse gases may 
actually frustrate citizen participation if it contains no citizen suit 
 
349 HELD, supra note 4, at 97. 
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provision or restricts remedies available under the Clean Air Act. 
Because climate change is a grave issue that grows more serious with 
the passage of time, these delays at the federal level are especially 
harmful. 
Therefore, state court remedies become more important. The 
United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit provide crucial guidance on how one may 
establish standing, demonstrate harms, and respond to the 
fundamental problems that would arise in a suit alleging damage from 
greenhouse gas accumulation. Massachusetts and Connecticut suggest 
three among many possible theories that state court plaintiffs could 
pursue to combat climate change: public nuisance, the public trust 
doctrine, and environmental citizen suits. 
Public trust doctrines and state environmental citizen suit statutes 
provide citizens with the opportunity to engage in some mitigation of 
greenhouse gases if state law allows legal challenges for harm to the 
environment outside the limitations posed by state environmental 
statutes. The protection of public trust lands can serve to stop 
damaging practices that exacerbate climate change. Damage to public 
trust lands could also establish the “violation of a public right” in a 
public nuisance claim. Assuming the federal Connecticut decision 
remains good law, public nuisance could provide citizens with an 
excellent basis for challenging greenhouse gas emissions from 
facilities such as coal-fired electric plants. 
In the end, citizen involvement in litigation to mitigate or adapt to 
climate change must take the deontological view: the moral necessity 
of opposing the impending cancellation of a mass transit project, or 
trying to get unnecessary incinerators closed, or even opposing a coal-
fired electric plant does not depend on the quantity of carbon dioxide 
reduced, but on preexisting moral duties of individuals and loosely 
organized small citizens’ groups in which individuals share 
responsibility for protecting the environment in their own communities.  
We have long since entered a period of consequences. 
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